Arnaud Peyronnet. Associate Researcher / FMES
Summary:
With the US presidential campaign heating up, the conflict in Gaza and its extension to Lebanon is becoming an extremely polarizing issue on the American domestic political scene. And the two candidates have rather divergent views regarding US foreign policy in the Middle East.
The Democrat candidate logically remains in line with the policy pursued by President Biden, with some concessions to the most progressive fringe of the Democrat camp regarding Gaza. If American support for Israel is not questioned, Kamala Harris calls on Israel for an immediate ceasefire, through strong political pressure from Washington if necessary. Vis-à-vis Iran, the Democrat seeks dialogue, the reduction of tensions and a non–confrontation paradigm in order to preserve regional stability and isolate Russia. In its relations with Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, the Democrat will highlight with its partners the need to respect human rights before deepening bilateral relations, unless China’s growing influence in the region puts a sense of realism back into Harris’ foreign policy.
A second Trump administration would be the logical continuation of the first one. On the Israel/Palestine issue, this new mandate could see three priorities: unconditional support for Israel, particularly in its fight against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran; support for the full integration of the Jewish state into its Arab environment; disappearance of the “Palestinian national question” from the international agenda. On Iran, a return to the maximum pressure policy is likely. The Saudi-American close link would be seen as the “solution” to the region’s problems.
In fact, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the only issue that really divides the two candidates. Regarding Iran and the Gulf countries, only a difference in “style” is noticeable, but the vision of American strategic interests remains shared by both candidates. Finally, neither Iraq nor the fight against jihadist terrorism is mentioned in the speeches of the two candidates, as if this “moment of history” was closed or even became “taboo”, acknowledging the gradual withdrawal of American ground forces from the region, to the great fear of the Jordanians and the Lebanese. Israel, the Gulf monarchies, Egypt and Turkey want a victory for Donald Trump, while other regional players, led by Iran, hope for Kamala Harris victory.
The challenges and potential priorities of US Policy in the Middle East
The United States is facing an increasingly competitive strategic environment in the Middle East with opposition from Russia (in Libya, Syria, Sudan, Red Sea, Iran), China (Gulf countries, Horn of Africa, Iran), Turkey (Qatar, Somalia, “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; Syria; Libya) and of course Iran (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon). China’s irruption in the Middle East[1] and the deepening of Russian-Iranian ties in the context of the war in Ukraine[2] represent huge challenges for Washington. In fact, and whatever the identity of the new American administration in January 2025, the United States will absolutely seek stability and calm in the Middle East[3] in order to counter its global competitors (China and Russia). From this point of view, the war in Gaza represents a serious obstacle, explaining the regular calls of the two candidates to stop this conflict as soon as possible.
In this troubled geopolitical environment, Washington’s position vis-à-vis Gulf States will be a key issue. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are increasingly autonomous, vis-à-vis United States, China, Russia, Iran and Turkey, in an assumed movement of multi-alignment. Saudi Arabia is seen in Washington as a “key state”, while Qatar’s role as mediator (with Hamas, Iran, the Taliban), its influence on the Arab street and its growing proximity to Turkey (including on the Palestinian issue) make it a major player. And if Trump is seen in Doha as “unpredictable” and therefore represents a “risk”, the Democrats are much better perceived, especially due to Kamala Harris’ speeches on the Palestinian issue. A Democrat administration could thus choose Qatar to be the leader of a Gaza rebuilding endeavor, even if it means letting the UAE decide fully of the political future of the Palestinian Authority. The Gulf countries are also representing a huge market for the American defense industry, the only provider of combat-proven security, particularly in the field of air defense. The United States also need some adjustments in the Gulf states’ oil production policies to weaken Russia economically. An increase of the Gulf production to diminish world prices (and therefore limit Russia’s financial revenues from its oil exports) could be then requested by Washington. In this context, the deepening of strategic relations between Washington and its regional allies is seen as a necessity for stabilizing the Middle East against Iran activism (in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) and even against Russia and China. The Abraham Accords concluded in 2020 represent an important milestone in this strategy, which is intended to expand[4] and which is not questioned by the two American parties. The intent to create a regional coalition of the willing in terms of air defense, in order to face the Iranian ballistic and drone threat (as seen with April 13, 2024[5] events), is the military pillar of this strategy.
While support for Israel benefits from a bipartisan consensus, the resilience of countries bordering the Jewish state represents a second major challenge for the next American administration. This is the case of Egypt, weakened by the conflict in Gaza and the economic consequences of the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. American support for the Egyptian government will probably increase, both politically and financially, eventually through Saudi funds[6]. President Sisi’s personal closeness with Trump[7] will give the latter an advantage, even if the Democrat candidate has tried in recent months to praise Cairo’s role for peace in the region. Jordan, a key ally of the United States (due to its strategic position for facilitating military operations in Syria and Iraq) sees its internal stability jeopardized by the consequences of the conflict in Gaza. Amman expects then Washington to issue a strong political messaging to Israel regarding Jordan sovereignty and authority over Jerusalem holy sites. However, Amman, despite being an enduring ally in the fight against terrorism, remains the blind spot of American regional policy, mainly because of the gradual American troops withdrawal from the Syrian-Iraqi theater. Lebanon is facing the same challenge, due to the US-Israeli proximity and the disproportionate Israeli response to the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks. But without a significant strategic commitment of the Americans to these countries, something not envisaged yet by either candidate, the spread of chaos in Lebanon and Jordan remains possible.
The Syrian-Iraqi theatre and the fight against ISIS are no longer a topic of interest in the United States and are not even mentioned in the candidates’ speeches. The American withdrawal from this area thus seems inevitable and an end-state shared by both political parties, marking finally the end of the long war against Islamic terrorism that began in 2001, even if ISIS still poses a threat to the region[8]. The American and Iraqi governments also agreed at the end of August 2024 to withdraw American and coalition forces[9] from Iraq between September 2025 and the end of 2026[10], leaving afterwards this country open to the strong influence of other regional actors (Iran, Turkey, Russia).
The US-Turkish relationship represents a third major issue for Washington. Turkey’s regional role is growing, a result of its neo-Ottoman policy revitalized by its firm opposition to Israel following the war in Gaza. Turkey has moved closer to Egypt and Iraq while concluding defense agreements with Qatar and Somalia. In addition, Ankara is hosting several vital NATO bases for US forces and has become since 2022 a “useful deal maker” between the United States and Russia, as shown by the exchanges of Russian and American prisoners on Turkish soil on 1 August 2024. However, Turkey is very critical of US pro-Israel leaning policy, which is a source of distrust in an already tense relationship with the Biden administration. The potential return of a Trump administration is thus viewed favorably in Ankara, in order to reset a broken dialogue with Washington. Turkey knows that its strategic position is valuable in negotiations with Trump, something that will undoubtedly be more difficult with Kamala Harris who embodies Joe Biden’s continuity[11].
Kamala Harris and Democrat’s Middle East policy
Kamala Harris, who has little experience on international issues, represents the liberal wing of the US Democrat Party, a character further accentuated by the choice of Tim Waltz as her running mate[12]. While her Middle East objectives should be largely Joe Biden policy continuation, some differences in style and with a more “liberal” touch could emerge in order to satisfy her political support base[13].
Showing support for Israel remains an imperative for the American political class. Kamala Harris is no exception and fits into this bipartisan redline. As senator, she repeatedly supported pro-Israel resolutions[14], even against Obama administration, and reiterated Israel’s right to defend itself. Similarly, she has always being opposed to the idea of an embargo on American weapons transfer to Israel[15]. And she remains close to American Jewish liberal positions. However, she repeatedly mentioned her fierce opposition to Israeli government’s way of waging the war in Gaza[16], distancing herself from Joe Biden’s very prudent stance. She did not attend Israeli Prime Minister’s speech to Congress on July 25, 2024 and her official meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu was, according to some sources, “tense”. She is particularly concerned by the Palestinian population plight in Gaza, calling for an immediate ceasefire by Israel. She is in favor of increased political pressure on the Israeli government in order to end the war and to efficiently deliver humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. But Harris remains a proponent of “balance” in the national and international arenas. She did not take advantage of the Democrat convention in August to propose a fundamental breakthrough on the Gaza issue, the most polarizing topic of American foreign policy since the 2003 Iraq war[17]. In fact, in the event of a new Democrat administration, American rhetoric towards Israel could be harsher than it is today, accentuating the political misalignment between the two countries. A Harris administration could then be similar to the Carter one: US support for Israel but not at the expense of Palestinian rights. New initiatives to promote a two-state solution could be proposed[18], much to the despair of Netanyahu government or even the Israelis themselves.
Regarding Iran, a Democrat administration will follow Biden legacy, namely the seek for dialogue, limitation of tensions and a desire for non-confrontation in order to preserve regional stability. On Iran’s nuclear program, and while this issue could be one of the first challenges for the new administration following the ongoing regional escalation between Israel and Iran, it is unlikely that Kamala Harris will want to resume negotiations with Iran, unless it demonstrates its willingness to make concessions[19]. The Biden administration did not make any diplomatic progress on this now “frozen” issue. The Democrat candidate remains however in favor of JCPOA[20], in complete opposition with her Republican opponent. In 2018, she strongly criticized Trump’s “reckless” decision to withdraw from JCPOA, which she considered a major success of the Obama administration. She also condemned in 2020 the elimination by the United States of Qassem Soleimani[21], in order to avoid “escalation and confrontation”[22]. If a diplomatic dialogue is opened by Tehran, particularly in the context of her new presidency, a resumption of negotiations remains theoretically possible. A Harris administration, however, will put greater pressure on Iran (and on other countries) regarding human rights, which will certainly become a political redline for her. Kamala Harris has been widely critical of the Iranian regime’s violence against protesters and anti-government movements since 2022[23].
With Gulf countries, and in particular Saudi Arabia, a new Democrat administration should continue to insist on the human rights issue. When in the Senate, Kamala Harris sharply criticized Saudi Arabia for the conduct of its war in Yemen and for its involvement in the death of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi. She has even been opposed to the sale of weapons to Riyadh[24]. The Democrat candidate regularly spoke in favor of an improved US-Saudi relationship, but only if it “corresponds to the values and interests of the United States”[25]. But a dose of “realism” could be imposed on the Democrat administration in its relations with the Gulf countries, especially if A. Blinken, a seasoned secretary of state well aware of the power struggles underway in the Gulf, is maintained. The continuation of American efforts for a trilateral agreement between Washington, Riyadh and Jerusalem, including American security guarantees for the Wahhabi kingdom, seems to have the full support of K. Harris, provided that Israel accepts a path for the constitution of an independent Palestinian state (a Saudi demand that the Democrat candidate can only support). Such a trilateral rapprochement would be a huge US diplomatic victory against China and Russia. The extension of the Abraham Accords to the fields of technology and energy transition would also probably be sought by the new Democrat administration.
A second Trump administration in the wake of the first one
The first Trump administration was behind the September 2020 Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, but also behind the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and an aborted peace plan between Israelis and Palestinians. The foundations of this “Trump policy” were twofold: first, a desire to expand United States weight in the Middle East issue when Washington saw an interest or opportunity to do so (concept of “peace through strength”)[26]. Second, an openly pro-Israel position[27] excluding the Palestinians from any conflict resolution (seen as Israeli-Arab and not Israeli-Palestinian). It is then very likely that a second Trump administration will be based on the same principles with maybe a desire to accentuate the American military “withdrawal” from the region, ultimately leaving the Iranian issue to its regional allies (Israel and Saudi Arabia) but with American guarantees (“leading from behind”). And this stance represents a major difference with the Democrat administration. Trump could favor Israel a greater freedom of action in order to act against Iran, its regional proxy network (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen) and its nuclear program. In exchange of an unconditional US political support, the Jewish state could act as a “regional policeman”, in its interests and those of the United States, preventing the latter from maintaining exposed ground troops in the region (Iraq, Syria, Jordan). This major breakthrough in the Washington/Tel Aviv strategic relationship would then raise Israel to the rank of a major power, on a par with Turkey, for the management of conflicts in the North of the Middle East (line extending from Gaza to Iraq).
Donald Trump has a privileged economic and personal link with the Wahhabi kingdom. In 2016, Saudi Arabia was the scene of his first trip abroad as President. He remains highly appreciated by the Gulf States for his firm opposition to Iran, for his pragmatism and his lack of interest in the human rights issue. A deeper security partnership with Washington being ardently sought by these countries[28], and particularly by Saudi Arabia, new opportunities on broader regional issues (extension of the Abraham Accords for example) could occur under a second Trump administration. A Republican administration could foresee a new framework agreement with Riyadh (a new Quincy-type agreement) to counter China’s influence, deter Iran, empower Gulf countries, and ensure Israel’s regional integration (and the disappearance of the Palestinian question) in exchange for strong US security guarantees and enhanced energy cooperation. Such an agreement would be consistent with the “transactional approach” of Trump. In any case, a Saudi-American enduring renewed strategic partnership will undoubtedly be a high priority for a second Trump administration and will be seen in Washington as the “solution” to the region’s problems.
The “Deal of the Century” proposed by Trump in 2020, seen in the White House as a transactional peace plan between Israelis and Palestinians, recognized the legality of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and thus the Jewish state’s claims on Judea and Samaria, in exchange for some Israeli territory bordering Egypt and Gaza that was scheduled to be transferred to Palestinians. Given the current situation and the ongoing conflict in Gaza, this project seems now totally obsolete. The Israeli military operations in Gaza and the occupation of the Palestinian strip by the IDF make the possibility of land swaps illusory. But Trump remains committed to defend Israel and has strongly criticized Biden administration’s attempts to freeze US arms deliveries to Tel Aviv. On the other hand, he was embarrassed by the duration of the conflict, seen as damaging Israel’s image and therefore United States one. He has repeatedly asked the leaders of the Jewish state to end this war “as soon as possible”[29]. He also criticized the Israeli government for its failures during October 7, 2023 attacks[30]. In August 2024, at a campaign rally, he made it clear that if elected president, Israel would receive all the support needed to quickly end the war in Gaza, threatening Hamas with severe retaliation from the United States if American hostages still being held were not released. On the Israel/Palestine issue, a second Trump administration could be based on three principles: unconditional support for Israel, particularly against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran; support for an integration of the Jewish state into its Arab environment through the extension of the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia (in exchange of strong US security guarantees for Riyadh); the termination of the Palestinian “national question” through the inclusion of its population in neighboring countries (through special deals with Washington). A new Trump administration will then not be favorable to the Palestinian cause. The reconstruction of Gaza with American money will be almost impossible, the Israeli religious far-right remaining very close to Trump’s advisers. David Friedman, former US ambassador to Israel during Trump’s first mandate, as well as Jared Kushner, his son-in-law, are talking openly about Israel’s annexation of the West Bank, Gaza shoreline real estate investments and the displacement of populations from the strip to the Negev or other countries, without any right of return[31].
On Iran, a second Trump administration would probably trigger the return of the maximum pressure policy through increasing sanctions, particularly against Iranian oil exports[32], and the targeting of senior Pasdaran executives in the region[33]. On the other hand, his new administration will refrain from maintaining a strong US military footprint in the Middle East, in accordance with an isolationist stance linked to the current American “war fatigue” in the region and a much more political interest on the competition with China. The withdrawal of US troops from the Middle East was a promise of Trump before his first term and he constantly tried to do so, even opposing his advisers[34]. This topic will remain relevant during a second Trump administration that could see the complete withdrawal of US forces from Syria and Iraq, and even other countries, delegating the security of the region to its local allies (Israel, Turkey), fueling the fears of Jordan and Lebanon.
[1] Towards a geopolitical realignment in the Middle East, Arnaud Peyronnet, FMES, 29/03/2023.
[2] With a strategic partnership in full development, with Tehran exporting ammunition and missiles to Moscow in exchange for access to sensitive technologies potentially in the nuclear domain.
[3] As shown by the intense negotiations led by the United States in August 2024 to link a potential ceasefire agreement in Gaza to a regional cessation of hostilities.
[4] U.S. policy seeks to integrate Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords.
[5] Massive attack on Israel by Iran (300 missiles and drones launched) countered by numerous multinational air defense means, under the aegis of USCENTCOM (US Command for the Middle East and Central Asia).
[6] Long lasting support for Egypt could be one of the topics of Riyadh/Washington bilateral negotiations.
[7] A donation made by President Sisi to the Trump campaign is causing controversy. Washington Post, 02/08/2024.
[8] According to CENTCOM, the number of ISIS attacks in the Syrian-Iraqi theater doubled in 2024 compared to 2023. In addition, the future of the internment camps for jihadists and their sympathizers in northeastern Syria remains uncertain. New York Times, 03/09/2024. At the end of August, a joint raid made by American and Iraqi forces led to the elimination of 15 ISIS terrorists in Iraq.
[9] The American forces have 2500 personnel in Iraq, 900 in Syria. Middle East Eye, 06/09/2024.
[10] Middle East Eye, 06/09/2024.
[11] This does not prevent President Erdogan from seeking a bilateral meeting with the Democrat candidate. Türkiye Today, 20/09/2024.
[12] While Tim Waltz supports the Democrats’ traditional policy in the Middle East, he seems less interventionist than most and looks with great suspicion Washington’s regional allies, particularly their stance on human rights. Al Jazeera, 08/08/2024.
[13] Especially among Arab-Americans voters and the left-wing of the Democrat Party, present in large numbers in Michigan (a swing state). They strongly criticize Biden administration’s lack of results in pressuring Israel to stop the war in Gaza.
[14] Al Majalla, 04/08/2024.
[15] BBC, 08/08/2024.
[16] In March 2024, she said “Israel was not doing enough to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza,” even threatening the Jewish state with “consequences if it launches a ground invasion of Rafah.” Reuters, 22/07/2024.
[17] Al Monitor, 25/08/2024.
[18] Kamala Harris said that “the two-state solution is the only way for a democratic and secure State of Israel and for giving the Palestinians their rights to freedom, security and prosperity” Al-Sarira, 09/08/2024.
[19] Reuters, 22/07/2024.
[20] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
[21] Al Qods force commander, Al-Sarira, 09/08/2024.
[22] Ibid.
[23] The National, 22/07/2024.
[24] Al Majalla, 04/08/2024 et Al Ahram, 30/07/2024.
[25] The National, 22/07/2024.
[26] Washington Post, 31/01/2024.
[27] As seen with the United States’ recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017 and the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan.
[28] The low military effects of the April 2024 Iranian attack on Israel demonstrated that a US-led regional air defense architecture was desirable by Gulf countries. This does not prevent Gulf countries from regularly sounding out the Chinese and Russians on security issues.
[29] Neue Zürchen Zeitung, 27/05/2024.
[30] The Guardian, 25/04/2024.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Economic weapon through cheap oil (via a strong revival of American oil production) would harm Iran, as well as Russia.
[33] Like the elimination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.
[34] In October 2019, he abruptly ordered the withdrawal of many American forces from eastern Syria.
