This article was originally published in Diplomatie magazine.

By Jean Marcou, associate researcher at FMES

Located at the crossroads of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, Turkey is essentially a country of migration (1). From the end of the 18th century, the retreat of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Balkans and the Caucasus, had major demographic consequences that contributed to the transformation of Anatolian populations, with the arrival of so-called muhadjirs (“emigrants”). In 1923, the advent of the Republic was accompanied by the forced exchange of Greek-Turkish populations provided for by the Treaty of Lausanne; this was the era of the arrival of the mübadil (“exchanged”). Thereafter, until the mid-20th century, migratory flows continued, feeding the young republic’s population with göçmen (“immigrants”), Turco-Muslims mainly from the Balkans. The Cold War brought the migration process to a temporary halt, but it was revived when the Communist bloc collapsed with the Büyük gezi (“Great Excursion”), a massive influx of Turks from Bulgaria, driven out by the fading regime of Todor Zhivkov.

La mutation du phénomène migratoire au tournant du millénaire

Until the second half of the 20th century, migration to Turkey was dominated by a kind of “withdrawal” phenomenon, with Turkish, Turkic or Muslim populations join forces to resettle in the heart of an empire, a fantasized homeland, which became a nation-state after the end of the First World War. With the bipolar world collapse, Turkey is confronted to new migratory phenomena. It became a country of transit, and even of destination. This development is due to to two main factors.

First and foremost, it stems from the conflicts, destabilization and crises that have multiplied around the country. The collapse of Iraq with the Gulf War (1990-1991) triggered the first major migratory flows (notably the exodus of Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein’s repression), which have continued for a long time as a result of the collapse of this state and the internal confrontations it has constantly been the scene of. Authoritarian rule in Iran, destabilization in Afghanistan, conflicts in the Caucasus (notably the Chechen wars) and changes in Central Asia have also fuelled constant migration to Turkey over the past three decades. Finally, from 2011-2012, the civil war in Syria led to the arrival of almost four million refugees, making Turkey the country with the world’s largest displaced population (2).

Secondly, another phenomenon needs to be taken into account. At the turn of the millennium, Turkey became an emerging country whose development is underpinned by constant growth. This paradigm shift has led to Turkey to become a major transit country for irregular immigration to Western Europe, and even a destination country, for migrants not only from the Middle East and Asia, but also from North and Sub-Saharan Africa. This migratory trend was already significant when Ankara opened accession negotiations with Brussels (2005), at which time it led to the long and complex process of drawing up a readmission agreement to force Ankara to accept the return of migrants arrested in Greece. After the outbreak of civil war in Syria (2011-2012), the migration issue became a major aspect of Turkish-European relations.

Europe/Turkey : crossed views on the migration issue

In 2015-2016, at the peak of the Syrian crisis, Ankara negotiated and signed an important agreement with the European Union (EU), pledging to strengthen border controls controls to contain immigration by cooperating with Frontex, and to welcome illegal migrants illegal migrants arriving in Greece from its territory. In return, the EU provides aid (almost nine billion in total) (3) to finance the reception of refugees in Turkey, and opens two chapters (17 and 33) (4) of the accession process (something that had not happened for some time) (5).

The tense context of these negotiations has led to speculation in Europe that Turkey is trying to take advantage of the migration phenomenon to relaunch the accession process, or even obtain other political, economic or financial concessions. It is true that, in the summer of 2019, as Russia and the regime of Bashar al-Assad are trying to regain control of Idlib, by the Astana process to the Turkish army, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, not feeling sufficiently supported by by his Western allies and fearing the arrival of a new wave of refugees from from this enclave, home to almost two million people, hardens his tone: “Are we going to carry this burden alone? If we don’t get the support we need to share the burden the EU and the rest of the world, we’re going to open our borders (6) ” On the Turkish side, in fact, both the AKP [Justice and Development Party and Development Party] and the opposition feel they have been abandoned by the by the West, and indeed by the international community, and forced to take in several million Syrian refugees.

In fact, in this country, the results are mixed, as the leverage that Europe’s dependence on Turkey may have provided of Europe’s dependence on Turkey to regulate migration is offset by the enormous counterbalanced by enormous political and social financial costs. In 2016, Ankara was already estimating the cost of receiving Syrians at over $30 billion. The integration of this new population, which has not always been easy to integrate, posing problems of cohabitation, is seen as one of the causes of the electoral setbacks the AKP’s electoral setbacks in recent years (7). The current government is criticized of having been too lax, insofar as it initially advocated an open-border policy, when it is not accused of having been tempted to take advantage the migration issue by planning to naturalize some of the people welcomed to of the people he welcomed, in order to broaden his electorate.

Securing and reversing migratory flows

This situation led Turkey to make it a priority to regain control of its borders, not only through legal measures (tighter controls, stricter conditions for issuing visas and residence permits, etc.), but also through material decisions such as the construction of separation walls, notably on the Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian borders. This phenomenon of securitization (8) of migration in Turkey has ultimately contributed to its willy-nilly integration into the wider management of European borders, with the country becoming a kind of EU step between its own walls and those built by Greece and Bulgaria with their Turkish neighbors, both of which are partly financed by Brussels.

Moreover, this sensitivity to the migration issue has been fuelled by the emergence of new crises. In 2021, the return of the Taliban to power saw Turkish security forces reinforce their control over the Iranian border and its wall (9). In autumn 2024, the escalation between Israel and Hezbollah and Israeli strikes on Lebanon, Iraq and Iran rekindled Turkish fears of new exoduses.

Against this backdrop, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has provided a ray of hope for the possible return of Syrian refugees, or at least some of them. Indeed, Turkey quickly reopened border crossings that had been closed since 2013, and set up a “Pioneer migrants” initiative that allows one member of a family to make up to three return trips to assess and prepare for the return of their loved ones to Syria (10).

On January 9, 2025, the Turkish Minister of the Interior announced that in the space of a month, more than 52,000 refugees had already crossed the border. Return is a complicated complicated process, and for the moment mainly concerns refugees living in precarious camps. For others, the choice between their country of origin and their country of adoption. But it is likely that, after several years of integration in Turkey, many will prefer to stay where they have rebuilt their lives, rather than return to a Syria where the standard of living and economic situation living standards and economic situation, and whose political prospects are still very uncertain.

Notes

 (1) Elif Aksaz, « La Turquie, terre méconnue d’immigration », Migrations Société, n°177, 2019/3, p. 19-33 (https://rebrand.ly/e25f1f).

(2) Cf. Jean Marcou, « La Turquie face à la pression migratoire », Les Grands Dossiers de Diplomatie, n°31, février-mars 2016, p. 54-57

(3) Nicolas Bourcier, « En Turquie, 4 millions de réfugiés, 9 millions d’euros d’aide européenne et un bilan mitigé », Le Monde, 24 avril 2024 (https://rebrand.ly/6424a6).

(4) Il s’agit des deux derniers chapitres ouverts à ce jour.

(5) Barthélémy Gaillard, « Crise migratoire : qu’est devenu l’accord entre l’Union européenne et la Turquie ? », Toute l’Europe, 7 avril 2024 (https://rebrand.ly/qpoboho).

(6) Marie Jégo, « Turquie : Erdoğan menace à nouveau d’“ouvrir la porte” aux réfugiés syriens », Le Monde, 13 septembre 2019 (https://rebrand.ly/glg3gd5).

(7) During the last presidential elections in 2023, the presence of Sinan Oğan, an ultranationalist candidate who denounced the risk of a “great replacement” of of Turks by Syrian refugees, probably forced Erdoğan to face a second round of voting to be elected. See Nicolas Bourcier, “Sinan Oğan, le troisième homme surprise de l’élection en Turquie”, Le Monde, May 15, 2023 (https://rebrand.ly/3y1m2vd).

(8) On this concept, see: Philippe Bourbeau, “Politisation et sécuritisation des migrations internationales: une relation à définir”, Critique internationale, n°61, 2013, pp. 127-147 (https://rebrand.ly/5b1326).

(9) Johanna Ollier, “Le mur à la frontière turco-iranienne”, Diplomatie, n°123, September-October 2023, p. 57-59.

(10) Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkish interior minister visits border crossing with Syria”, January 9, 2025 (https://rebrand.ly/2fa17a).