The chaos in Sudan keeps getting worse and threatens the entire region, but it does not receive the
coverage it deserves. Eclipsed by the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, the war between the national army,
the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary unit that grew out
of the Janjaweed militias has become increasingly brutal and uncontrollable. The war started in the
capital city of Khartoum and has spread to fourteen of Sudan’s eighteen states, covering an area nearly
three times the size of France. A fierce media war accompanies the fighting on the ground. Many people
question the causes of this war. The answer may lie in the history of kleptocratic military rule and the
recently shattered revolution. Following the fall of Omar Hassan al-Bashir’s regime in 2019,
Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of
the SAF, and Mohamed Hamadan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” chief of the RSF militia, allied to seize
power, undermining the transition to democracy. Now turned enemies, they provide different narratives
to justify their war. Al-Burhan claims to be fighting a “dignity war,” while Hemedti says he fights to
restore democracy—the same values they have wrecked.
Both the SAF and the RSF rely on external support for weapons, money, and advisors, which further
inflames the conflict. Consequently, Sudan’s war may last a long time due to its complexity, invisibility
to the international community, and foreign interference.

A complex war

Sudan’s war isn’t a simple two-sided affair between the SAF and RSF. It’s a complicated regional,
ethnic, and political internal power struggle intertwined with international ramifications. Additionally,
the vast geographical extent of the conflict enables the proliferation of all sorts of criminal activities.
Sudan covers a large area of 1,861,484 square kilometers. It shares long and porous borders with Egypt,
Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and South Sudan. oreover, the
ambiguous roles of the U.S. administration and its allies in the Gulf and Africa, along with the inaction
of the UN, further complicate the war.
Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, the military has dominated politics, with only ten years governed
by civilian elected governments [1]. The army’s indoctrination began under Colonel Jaafar Mohamed
Nimeiri [2], who seized power in 1969 and continued under General Omar Hassan al-Bashir [3], who took
power in 1989. This became more evident when al-Bashir turned the SAF into an instrument of his
Islamic regime. Moreover, military businesses gave the SAF the upper hand over the country’s
resources, mostly utilized for the regime’s benefit. Throughout Sudan’s history, both military and
civilian governments have employed regional or tribal paramilitary militias to fight in southern and
western Sudan. However, al-Bashir was the first to institutionalize ethnically based militias when he
transformed the Janjaweed in 2013, officially recognizing it as a military force through the Rapid
Support Forces Act of 2017. The RSF was attached to the presidency, as required by Hemedti to evade
any control by the SAF. This move has sown problematic seeds for the RSF’s integration into the SAF,
which is a key element of their hostilities today.
Sudan has an awful record of impunity. Previously wanted persons by the ICC (including former
President al-Bashir) have never been held accountable for their crimes in Darfur. The Sudanese
transitional authority jailed them in 2019, but it failed to hand them over to the ICC. Both Al-Burhan
and Hemedti fear prosecution for their past and ongoing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. Losing power means losing immunity, unless a comfortable deal is worked out for them.
Hemedti and the RSF have a history filled with crimes that date back to 2003. The SAF is no less
encumbered. In the euphoria of the December 2018 revolution, al-Burhan and Hemedti were allowed
to escape justice for their past war crimes. Worse, after the massacre of peaceful protesters at the sit-in
outside military headquarters in Khartoum on 3 June 2019, the civilian forces went on to sign the power-
sharing declaration with the perpetrators without a firm commitment to accountability. Since the war
began in April 2023, the RSF has resumed its exceptionally brutal conduct. Civilians were massacred,
and Sudan’s main cities (Khartoum, el-Geneina, el-Fasher, Nyala, Wad Medani, Sinja, in particular)
have been besieged, bombed, and heavily looted. On the other hand, the SAF made fatal airstrikes in
Khartoum and Darfur. Today, al-Burhan and Hemedti seek a role in any future deal to protect themselves
from prosecution and accountability: war could be that option.
During the thirty years of al-Bashir regime, the political parties experienced serious rifts, including
divisions within the Islamic Front itself. However, the divisions that struck the political forces after the
December Revolution of 2018 are unprecedented in Sudan’s political history [4]. Civilian forces are
divided along political, ethnic, regional, and ideological lines. Since the outbreak of war, additional
dividing elements have emerged: either supporting or opposing the war and siding with the SAF or the
RSF. The Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadom) is a newly formed coalition
that already shows signs of division, particularly regarding its rapprochement with the RSF [5]. Tagadom
has not succeeded in uniting all the parties; on the contrary, some of them are even further divided today.
Before the eruption of war, Sudan was already rife with militias and arms. Now, the situation is
worsened by the repeated divisions within the militias and rebel movements, the return of Sudanese
mercenary militias, and the proliferation of criminals who have been set free from prisons. The RSF
has been joined by militias from Darfur, Gazira, and Blue Nile states, as well as by warlords returning
from Libya. On the other hand, the SAF has formed military groups and organized popular resistance
camps to encourage self-defense against the RSF. Some are led by former Islamist figures, these camps
are portrayed as a continuation of the former regime.

An invisible war

The response to Sudan’s war has been negligible in terms of political, media, and humanitarian
donations. The U.S. and the UN have been slow to appoint dedicated special envoys to Sudan. The
Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, was appointed only at the
end of November 2023, while the U.S. envoy, Tom Perriello, was appointed in February 2024. The
Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) could convene a meeting on Sudan at the
heads of state and government level only a month after the war began [6]. Despite the brutality of war, the
high risk of regional implosion, and the proliferation of militias and jihadists, both internal and external
factors could explain such neglect.
Internally, civilians’ inability to unite and speak with one voice has weakened their position and
visibility, exacerbating the confusion surrounding the causes of the conflict. Is it a war between a general
and a warlord? Is it an intra-military conflict? Is it a war waged by elements of the former Muslim
Brotherhood regime? Or is it a conflict caused by external meddlers? Another internal factor is the lack 3
of adequate communication. Sudanese and international media have a limited presence on the ground.
While some media outlets left Sudan for security reasons, others were asked to leave. In April 2024, the
Sudanese authorities suspended three Arab satellite channels for lacking transparency and
unprofessional reporting practices [7]. Due to the war, more than forty Sudanese newspapers, radio
stations, and television channels ceased operations [8], allowing social media to become a significant
source of news and information.
One of the main external factors is that the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have drawn significant global
attention. The few resources deployed, the number of high-level political statements, and media
reporting reveal how marginal the Sudan war is. Data from The Economist shows that in 2024, news
coverage of Sudan averaged 600 monthly stories compared to 100,000 stories for the conflicts in Gaza
and Ukraine [9]. Another data provided by Foreign Policy magazine states, “Since the war in Sudan began
over a year ago, President Joe Biden has tweeted about Sudan four times—three of which were about
the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum right after fighting broke out” [10]. Besides, there is
global fatigue regarding African conflicts, and Sudan’s war is no exception. Sudan endured the longest
civil war in Africa and both the most successful and the failed coups d’état. The current war has
triggered fatigue not only among the international community but also within Sudan’s diaspora, which
was a powerful force in mobilizing international support to topple al-Bashir’s regime in 2019.
Out of sight, the belligerents freely expanded the bloodshed, committing horrific crimes. Thousands of
civilians have been killed, and millions have been uprooted. Sexual and gender-based violence is
widespread yet underreported. Infrastructure is ruined. The scale of economic loss further worsens
humanitarian conditions. The industrial and agricultural sectors in conflict areas have been wiped out.
Mining and farming, the country’s main exports, have plunged significantly. The Sudanese pound has
depreciated by 246 percent and continues to fall against the US dollar [11] while the currency’s black
market thrives [12]. Incomes have declined or vanished, plunging over two million people into poverty,
along with rising food insecurity. Another aspect of the invisibility of Sudan’s war is that humanitarian
donations have become meager. The UN humanitarian appeal for Sudan is struggling to raise the
targeted funds. Martin Griffiths, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, admits that the
UN has failed to protect and aid: “It’s very, very difficult to get attention to Sudan” [13]. Six months after
the International Humanitarian Conference for Sudan in Paris on 15 April 2024, where thirty-three
countries committed to 2.2 billion dollars in aid [14], the Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 has
received 50% of the required aid so far [15].
In its 2750 (2024) resolution, the UN Security Council stated that “the situation in Sudan continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region”. However, the UN Security Council
issued four resolutions in 2024 regarding the situation in Sudan [16], but none have been respected. Worse,
weapons and ammunition flow into Darfur in flagrant violation of the Darfur arms embargo resolution,
which was renewed in September 2024. Despite the overwhelming evidence of arms inflow, the UN
Council has applied no sanctions against the belligerents or their arms suppliers. The lack of high-
profile, coordinated peace initiatives hinders the achievement of at least a cessation of hostilities. Sudan
borders seven fragile countries, and the conflict threatens to spill over their borders, fueling regional 4
rivalries and burdening these vulnerable economies with a large flow of refugees. Sudan already has
long-standing disputes with Ethiopia over the Al Fashqa triangle, which is fertile farmland, with Egypt
over the Halaib triangle, a mineral resource-rich area, and with South Sudan over the oil-rich Abyei
area. On the Red Sea side, Sudan’s war may risk depressing the volume of trade passing through the
Suez Canal and raising international tensions over this vital waterway.

A war fueled by foreign meddlers.

Sudan’s war is drawing in multiple foreign meddlers, divided between those who claim to be neutral
(the U.S. and Saudi Arabia), the SAF supporters (Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Algeria and Egypt), and the RSF
backers (mainly the UAE). China is silent, adopting a discreet position. Foreign involvement in Sudan
could be motivated by the strategic importance of the Red Sea, economic interests, and power influence.
Each country, however, has its own interests and approaches.
The U.S. has sanctioned Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood regime for many years. However, Sudan is not
important enough for the U.S. to merit significant efforts, if not for Sudan’s rapprochement with Russia
and Iran. The U.S. fears the establishment of a Russian or Iranian naval logistics facility on the Red Sea
and the presence of the Wagner Group in the country. However, the U.S. counts on the UAE as a Mideast
ally for managing the crisis in the region, in addition to its important trade partnership, particularly in
the defense industry. This could explain why the U.S. is silent about the UAE’s role in Sudan’s crisis
and why President Biden loosely discussed Sudan while meeting Mohamed Bin Zayed on 23 September
2024 [17]. The U.S. has initiated peace negotiations with the Saudis between the SAF and RSF in Jeddah
and Geneva, but neither initiative has stopped hostilities.
Russia’s involvement in Sudan is ambiguous and duplicitous. Former President al-Bashir initiated a
closer relationship with Russia and the Wagner Group when he invited Vladimir Putin to build a naval
base at Port Sudan [18] to protect the country from U.S. aggression [19]. Al-Bashir reopened the country to
Russian weapons imports and granted the Wagner Group gold mining concessions. Reportedly, up to
85% of Sudan’s gold is thought to be sold off the books to the UAE and Russia [20]. After the fall of al-
Bashir’s regime, the Wagner Group became increasingly involved alongside the RSF, providing
military assistance, political advisors, and social media campaigns. The war has deepened this
collaboration as the Wagner Group continues to supply arms to the RSF in return for gold. On the other
hand, the Kremlin has approached Sudan’s government in Port Sudan by recognizing the Sovereignty
Council of Sudan as the representative of the Sudanese people. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Mikhail Bogdanov visited Port Sudan on 29 April 2024 and provided military and economic
assistance [21]. However, this move is still marred by ambiguity as Russia is the only country that
abstained from voting on the UN Security Council resolution calling for the RSF to end its siege on El-
Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State [22]. Additionally, Russia is blocking the U.S. proposal to the UN
Security Council to sanction two RSF commanders [23]. During Bogdanov’s visit, the Russians reportedly
revisited the issue of constructing a naval base in Sudan. A naval base on the Red Sea coast would
provide Russia with crucial geopolitical positioning in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Also,
the Russian delegation inquired about the SAF’s collaboration with Ukrainian special forces [24].
Ukrainian special forces reportedly operate in Sudan alongside the SAF to combat Wagner mercenaries aligned with the RSF [25]. Other aspects of Russia’s rapprochement could include arms sales and aligning
Russian policy with Iran’s, which supports the SAF.
Iran is also an important player in the Sudanese conflict. In the 1990s, former President al-Bashir
nurtured close ties with Iran, a relationship driven by their mutual isolation from the international arena.
However, the Sudanese government suspended diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016 and tilted toward
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. After an eight-year rift [26], Sudan and Iran restored diplomatic and military
ties in October 2023, and ambassadors were exchanged [27]. Iran has backed the SAF and started to deliver
arms (including Mohajer-6 drones) to the SAF in December 2023. Reportedly, an Iranian cargo plane
owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has made several trips to Port Sudan [28]. Iran is seeking
allies that share its political orientation, in addition to breaking free from diplomatic isolation and trade
sanctions. Moreover, it aims to establish a presence on the Red Sea coast to challenge its rivalries.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar compete for influence and aspire to play a broader role beyond the
Middle Eastern region. Although Qatar is a common rival for the Saudis and Emirates, they also have
their own rivalries. Before the outbreak of the war, through their financial largesse toward Sudan’s
transitional government, Saudi Arabia and the UAE succeeded in keeping Qatar, Turkey, and Iran away
from Sudan while attempting to diminish the influence of political Islam in the country. However, with
the onset of the war, their interests have significantly diverged. The UAE is the main backer of the RSF,
providing substantial military support not only since the beginning of the war but also for the last four
years. Moreover, the UAE has drawn Sudan’s neighboring countries into the conflict to side with the
RSF. The UAE’s supply of weapons and mercenaries transits through complicit countries: Chad, Libya,
South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, and the Central African Republic, all of which have received
substantial development and military aid from the UAE in return. Despite the UAE’s denial, U.N. and
other documented reports confirm the UAE’s arms supply to the RSF [29]. The UAE aims to combat the
Muslim Brotherhood, pursue its ambition of controlling numerous seaports, and play a vital role in
global trade by becoming involved in Sudan’s war. Besides Sudan’s strategic position on the Red Sea
coast, the UAE has specific interests in the RSF, which has two dimensions: inside Sudan, to secure
large agricultural projects that address the UAE’s food insecurity and ensure gold procurement, in
addition to controlling ports on the Red Sea. Outside Sudan, it aims to keep RSF fighters in Yemen and
Libya while ensuring a supply of mercenaries for possible future regional missions.
The Saudis claim to be neutral in Sudan’s conflict and present themselves as credible peace mediators.
However, their collaboration with the RSF in Yemen continues. Of course, the reestablished relations
between Sudan and Iran raise concerns for Riyadh and add to its Gulf rivals. But the Saudis firstly seek
stability and security in the region, particularly in the Red Sea, due to its oil exports and the Vision
2030 projects, including the futuristic NEOM megacity project [30]. In Sudan, the Saudis and Emiratis
compete for influence, agricultural land, and seaports along the Red Sea coast. The Saudis view the
UAE’s interests in the Red Sea as a direct encroachment on their backyard. Succeeding in ending the
fighting in Sudan would boost the Saudis’ image and influence in the Arab and Muslim arenas, giving
them a stronger position, that contrasts with the UAE, viewed as supporting the aggressor.
Qatar tacitly voiced its diplomatic support for the SAF while requesting that the international
community refrain from interfering in Sudan’s internal affairs. Qatar is considered a supporter of the
Muslim Brotherhood and a close ally of the former al-Bashir regime. During the Gulf crisis (2017-2021), Sudan was among the few Arab countries that resisted Emirati and Saudi pressure to cut ties
with Qatar. A victory for the SAF may allow Qatar to regain an essential ally while pursuing mining
and agricultural projects, while a victory for the RSF would compromise its relationship with Sudan.
Egypt is traditionally a supporter of the SAF because a military regime governs Egypt. Besides, there
is a close relationship with many Sudanese military officers who graduated from the Egyptian Military
Academy. Not only did Cairo not condemn al-Burhan’s October 2021 coup, but it was openly
supportive, believing that military rule would keep the Muslim Brotherhood at bay and help stabilize
the country. However, since the eruption of war, Egypt has adopted a low profile despite Hemedti’s
accusation that the Egyptian Air Force struck its troops in Sennar State [31]. Egypt has taken timid
initiatives to resolve the conflict, even though Egypt holds a military cooperation agreement with
Sudan [32] and has received the highest number of refugees. Moreover, Egyptians are highly concerned
about the security of the Red Sea and the River Nile, particularly regarding the Renaissance Dam crisis.
Reasons may lie behind Egypt’s acute economic crisis and its dependency on Gulf countries for
funding [33].
Supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey hosts many influential figures from the former
Sudanese regime who fled Sudan after the fall of al-Bashir. In 2017, Sudan and Turkey signed a ninety-
nine-year lease to restore Suakin Island and develop a naval dock [34] using Qatari funds [35]. Although the
deal was formally intended to restore the old Ottoman buildings, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and
even Eritrea viewed it as an encroaching move by Turkey in the Red Sea region [36]. Since the eruption
of war, it’s reported that Turkey has provided the SAF with Bayraktar TB2 drones via Egypt in
September 2023 [37], and Amnesty International stated that “shipment-level trade data indicates that
hundreds of thousands of blank guns have been exported by Turkish companies to Sudan in recent
years, along with millions of blank cartridges” [38]. In supporting the SAF, Turkey may wish to advance
the Suakin deal further to pursue its naval port on the Red Sea coast and ensure the return of its Islamist
allies

Conclusion

Several peace initiatives were launched, and meetings were held in Jeddah, Addis Ababa, Paris, Geneva,
Nairobi, Cairo, and Djibouti. In addition, workshops and seminars were organized by European and
U.S. governments in France, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Kenya. Yet, these peace initiatives
gained little traction. Multiple factors paralyze peace initiatives, but what lies behind them is a lack of
consensus on the causes of the war. For the RSF and Tagadom, the Muslim brothers (considered to have
infiltrated the SAF) fired the first bullet. For the SAF and its supporters, it’s a failed coup d’état by the
RSF. The rhetoric about who started the war is critical because it shapes public opinion, co-opts external
supporters, and influences the mediators.
Another key factor hindering peace talks is both parties’ insistence on a military solution. The failure of
the Geneva talks held in August 2024 raises doubts about the seriousness of both parties in reaching a
political settlement. In October 2024, the Sudanese army’s deputy commander-in-chief, Lieutenant
General Ibrahim Jaber, stated that peace talks may continue, but the army will not cease fighting [39].
Another reason is that foreign meddlers do not bear the destructive costs of the war, making them less 7
inclined to pursue peace. On the contrary, they keep pouring large quantities of weapons into the
country, which reduces the chances of achieving a peaceful solution. A third reason is the numerous and
competing mediation platforms. Peace talk platforms and the UN Security Council make decisions, sign
agreements and launch recommendations without any practical steps to implement them.
However, the peace process in Sudan requires three elements: civil forces need to reconcile, as the
proliferation of actors is causing confusion. Then, they should be given a role in peace talks to ensure
that the settlement is not solely military. The second is to stop the flow of weapons into the country;
arms suppliers should be held accountable. The third is to opt for an inclusive peace settlement rather
than limiting the discussion to the three areas of humanitarian access, protection of civilians, and
cessation of hostilities.
In such a bleak situation, one reason for optimism is the resilience of the Sudanese people. While 2.1
million Sudanese have found refuge in neighboring countries, more than 45 million are still living inside
Sudan, facing the hardships of war with strength and dignity every day.

1 Sudan holds the record for having the highest number of coups d’état in Africa. The Frequency of Coup Events from 1945 to 2023, by Country.
2 Nimeiri seized power with the help of socialists and communists, a group that called itself the “Free Officers”. They defined their cause as Arab nationalism and revolutionary socialism patterned after the ideology of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
3 Al-Bashir seized power with the help of the National Islamic Front of Hassan al-Turabi.
4 According to Dr. Alwathiq Kamir, a Sudanese academic and activist. “Unity of the Unionist: unfinished business”, Sudan Tribune, 24 September 2022.
5 Al-Hadi Idris Yahya, Vice President of Tagaddom, is also the Head of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, a Darfuri rebel movement that claims to be neutral but is accused of supporting the RSF in the el-Fasher battle.
6 The meeting was convened on 27 May 2023.
7 “Sudan suspends Arab Satellite Channels for lack of transparency and expired licenses”, Sudan Tribune, 2 April 2024.
8 “Hate speech and racism in Sudanese media”, Aljazeera media institute, 2 March 2024.
9 “Sudan: the war the world forgot”, The Economist, 24 May 2024.
10 “Why Is the World Ignoring a Looming Genocide in Sudan?”, Foreign Policy, 28 May 2024.
11 At the beginning of the war, the dollar’s price was about 560 Sudanese pounds to reach 1940 on 29 June 2024.
12 A full floating policy of the exchange rate of the Sudanese pound against the US dollar was adopted in march 2022.
13 “UN relief chief tells media “very, very difficult to get attention to Sudan”, OCHA, 7 February 2024.
14 International Humanitarian Conference for Sudan and its Neighbours in Paris, Financial announcement.
15 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 required 2.7 billion US$ for humanitarian aid, but only 441.4 million US$ were received as of 31 May 2024.
16 Resolution 2750, adopted by the Security Council at its 9721st meeting on 11 September 2024. Resolutions 2736, adopted by the Security Council at its 9655th meeting on 13 June 2024. Resolution 2725, adopted by the Security Council at its 9569th meeting on 8 March 2024. Resolution 2724, adopted by the Security Council at its 9568th meeting on 8 March 2024.
17 The two countries signed the strategic and defense partnership. “U.S.-UAE Joint Leaders’ Statement Dynamic
Strategic Partners”. The White House, 23 September 2024.
18 The agreement between Russia and Sudan on establishing a logistics centre for the Russian Navy in Sudan was signed in Khartoum on July 23, 2019, and in Moscow on December 1, 2020.
19 Al-Bashir during his meeting with Putin in Sochi, November 2017 reported saying “We are thankful to Russia for its position on the international arena, including Russia’s position in the protection of Sudan. We need protection from the aggressive acts of the United States”.
20 “Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war effort in Ukraine”, CNN, 29 July 2022.
21 “Russia offers ‘uncapped’ military aid to Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, 30 April 2024.
22 Resolution 2736, adopted by the Security Council at its 9655th meeting on 13 June 2024. The resolution, put forward by the United Kingdom, received 14 votes in favor, none against, with Russia abstaining.
23 On 27 August 2024, the U.S. formally proposed that an international travel ban and asset freeze be imposed on RSF head of operations Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed and RSF West Darfur Commander Abdel Rahman Juma Barkalla.
24 “Ukraine’s special services ‘likely’ behind strikes on Wagner-backed forces in Sudan”, CNN, 20 September 2023.
25 “Ukrainian Special Forces Interrogate Wagner Mercenaries in Sudan”, Kyiv Post, 5 February 2024.
26 Sudan broke ties with Iran in 2016, supposedly in solidarity with Saudi Arabia, but in reality, al-Bashir was seeking financial help from the Saudis.
27 Iranian ambassador Hassan Shah Hosseini was received in Port Sudan and Sudan ambassador Abdelaziz Hassan Saleh in Tehran.
28 “Iranian cargo flights arrive in Sudan”, Sudan war monitor, 30 January 2024.
29 “Full Text: UN Panel of Experts Report on Sudan”, Sudan War Monitor, 23 January 2024.
30 NEOM is a futuristic megacity on the Red Sea coast in northwest Saudi Arabia. The Public Investment Fund funds it for 500 billion dollars. It was launched in 2017 as part of Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 plan to diversify the kingdom’s economy away from oil and pivot toward tech and innovation. Neom webpage
31 “RSF leader accuses Egypt of direct military intervention in Sudan’s war”, Sudan Tribune, 9 October 2024.
32 “Egypt, Sudan sign joint military cooperation” Sudan Tribune, 2 March 2021.
33 Data from the Central Bank of Egypt indicate that the Gulf countries’ share in Egypt’s external debt amounts to $46.2 billion.
34 Renovation project of 650 million dollars aims to turn the island into a tourism and cultural place. The project was launched in January 2018 by Turkey’s state-run aid agency, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA).
35 http://www.madote.com/2017/12/turkish-base-in-sudan-problem-for-arab.html
36 During Erdogan’s visit to Sudan, Turkish, Sudanese and Qatari Army chiefs met in Khartoum on December 27, 2017.
37 “The Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones were delivered to Sudan’s military”, WSJ, 14 October 2023
38 “Sudan: Constant flow of arms fuelling relentless civilian suffering in conflict”, Amnesty International, 25 July 2024.
39 “Sudan army vows to fight on despite peace efforts”, BBC, 3 October 2024.