The year 2024 was marked by a change of era. One rupture follows another and the old world is gradually disappearing, swept away by a dual movement that the FMES has been describing for several years: on the one hand, a fracture between South and North, that separates the ways of thinking, values, and interests, both of states and their populations; and on the other hand, a geopolitical recomposition between East and West that is accelerating due to the polarization brought about by the challenge to Western leadership by the Eurasian powers. This upheaval is taking place in an atmosphere rendered noxious by the threat and uninhibited use of military force and the generalization of a strong resentment, exacerbated by social networks and increasingly sophisticated software.
These East-West and South-North forces fields, which intersect in the Eastern Mediterranean, place Europe in a position of vulnerability that its populations are beginning to perceive. The porosity between external and internal issues is a sign of the times, resulting from population flows, information exchange, and economic interactions. It is also a marker of the information war that is raging and weakening open and democratic societies. It is no surprise that European and French citizens are increasingly feeling the consequences of these fractures. The lack of a clear political strategy fosters epidermic reactions, focused on the consequences rather than the causes, and logically driven by the most radical political parties.
The European and French legislative elections in June and July 2024 bear the stamp of these anxieties. A populist surge continues across the European Union, driven by the fear of uncontrolled migration, which would weaken our societies by importing the resentment of Southern populations. The issue of migration now occupies a central place and polarizes two blocs that are distancing themselves, radicalizing, and gradually absorbing the center of the political spectrum. On the right, there is concern about the risk of importing antagonisms and their consequences into society. On the left, an ideological framework of openness toward the South is being developed, particularly in the interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the archetypal struggle for the emancipation of populations oppressed by the West. Ultimately, this radicalization of European voters, in opposite directions, expresses a shared concern regarding the security deterioration that surrounds them, both in the East and the South.
Four major events marked this year and illustrate in themselves the violence settling in, the unpredictability of events, and their interdependence in a world that has paradoxically shrunk while being marked by centrifugal forces: the Israeli rebound, the brutal fall of Bashar al-Assad, the bloody stabilization of the Ukrainian front, and the election of Donald Trump.
While the Israeli army demonstrated its strength in its response to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, its situation until the summer of 2024 was not comfortable, and the feeling of its vulnerability prevailed until September. In the south, Hamas’s attack showed that the Hebrew state was not invulnerable; in the north, Hezbollah promised to be a much tougher adversary; in the east, a taboo had been broken with the first strike on its soil by Iranian ballistic missiles in April; and in the west, Tel Aviv’s isolation was growing, even including from the United States, which provides essential military support.
In six months, Israel’s posture has improved considerably. The decapitation of Hezbollah’s leaders in September through a spectacular operation of sabotaging beepers and walkie-talkies, the elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah chiefs a few weeks later, along with lethal strikes in Lebanon and Syria, and the limited but very effective response to Iranian ballistic missile strikes in October, placed the Hebrew state in a far more comfortable position: its military credibility was restored, and its direct adversaries significantly weakened. These successes provoked another major event that would reshuffle the cards of the Middle East.
The brutal fall of Bashar al-Assad in December and the victory of the Islamist rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is, in fact, both the consequence and amplifier of this movement. Certainly, the economic crisis linked to sanctions is probably the primary cause of the Syrian regime’s weakening, which gradually transformed into a narco-state that exploited its own internal supporters.
But Israel’s blows to Hezbollah and Iran, which had been militarily supporting the regime, were the final blow, facilitated by the excellent preparation of rebels trained by the Turkish army. Russia’s priority on
the Ukrainian front forced its abandonment, which will leave lasting marks.
This theatrical turn of events disrupts the geopolitical hierarchy in both the Middle East and Africa. It is a setback for Moscow, which was forced to abandon its protégé and negotiate with the rebels to maintain its two military bases on the Syrian coast, and especially for Iran, which has just lost both its historical allies in Lebanon and Syria and its access to the Mediterranean and Israel. Turkey is the big winner and can now hope to extend its buffer zone along the northern Syrian border, eliminate any Kurdish resistance, and send many Syrian refugees back to their country. This upheaval is a relatively positive development for Israel, which, for a time, will be able to militarily dominate its northern neighbors, but the possibility
of the establishment of a radical Sunni caliphate hostile to both Israel and Europe, gaining access to the Mediterranean and potentially expanding into Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, is a concerning scenario for all.
The Ukrainian front played a role, as seen, in the collapse of the Syrian regime. Vladimir Putin went all-in this year in Ukraine to counter the Ukrainian offensive toward Kursk and continue nibbling at the front line. The reinforcement of 10,000 North Korean soldiers illustrates both the difficulty the Kremlin faces in terms of recruitment, Putin’s tenacious will, and the slowly developing Eurasian solidarity during this war: Pyongyang thus joins Tehran and Beijing in supporting Moscow in this conflict, further structuring an autocratic geopolitical bloc opposed to the West. To compensate for its slow progress in Ukraine, Russia is fully playing the indirect card to weaken the European camp. First, in its traditional sphere of influence, in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, where it disrupts electoral processes to distance these countries from its adversary. Then, in Africa, where Kremlin-backed militias are strengthening their position in the southern part of the continent, in Libya, Sudan, Mali, Niger, and now Chad. Finally, in Western Europe, where Russian destabilization attempts on social networks are becoming more frequent. Pressure is building as we await the deal Donald Trump has promised for 2025.
The victory of the Republican candidate on November 5 is probably the most decisive event of 2024, because of the multiple consequences it has already triggered and promises to trigger. His pacifism, transactionalism, unilateralism, obsession with China, and complete absence of ideological, historical, or moral references leave room for radical and unexpected changes. While we can expect at least a partial military disengagement from the region, his unpredictable nature and the awareness that this final term will be crucial in the image he leaves in history open the possibility of completely unforeseen turnarounds. In any case, only the interests of the United States will matter, and both allies and adversaries
will be judged and treated according to this.
Elsewhere, the «normal growth of chaos» is at work. The general indifference surrounding the 79th United Nations General Assembly, with a very sparse audience, illustrated the loss of prestige and authority of the UN. Its Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, strangely reinforced a competitor by participating in the BRICS+ summit in October in Kazan at the invitation of Vladimir Putin, despite being pursued by the International Criminal Court. Rigged elections no longer shock anyone, as shown by the indifference toward the re-election of the Algerian and Tunisian presidents in the autumn. Amid this indifference, war rages in Sudan, and insecurity and massacres accumulate in Niger, Mali, and the Great Lakes region.
There is no reason why the process of increasing tensions between populations and states should not continue into 2025. Europeans, who are positioned close to these hotspots, are already affected, even
if they are not all aware of it. They should prepare to face antagonisms of all kinds, coming from all directions, which are already perceptible and will intensify in the East, South, and now also in the West. The American umbrella is likely to become more expensive, less impermeable, and may even contribute to the storm that is approaching.
In the face of these challenges, we must, as March Bloch identified 80 years ago, not lose the intellectual battle of understanding the world. This is the fight that FMES is proud to participate in, to avoid experiencing a new «strange defeat».
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