Dr Niagalé Bagayoko, FMES Africa Program Manager and President of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN).

Middle Eastern countries’ diplomatic efforts in Africa are marked by strong personalization, the activation of religious networks, and proactive policies in areas such as armaments and security cooperation. A common feature of their approaches is the pursuit of greater influence within multilateral forums and an increasing role in mediation processes aimed at resolving conflicts across the continent. These diplomatic initiatives are especially focused on the Horn of Africa, West Africa, and the Sahel. While Saudi Arabia has historically been a significant player in Africa, countries like Turkey, Israel, Qatar, the UAE, and Iran are now making increasingly visible and active efforts to establish a stronger presence on the continent.

INTRODUCTION

Long marked by the memory and painful legacy of the Eastern slave trade [1], relations between the African continent and the Middle Eastern powers have been renewed since the turn of the 2000s. Most of the states in the region have sought to expand their presence and influence in Africa.

The policies of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran have a number of common features such as:

• the strong personalization of diplomatic relations, through the investment of the highest authorities themselves;
• seeking the support of African states in multilateral, UN or regional bodies;
• a geographical tropism for the Horn of Africa;
• the search for an expansion and diversification of bilateral relations towards other regions of the continent, in particular the Sahel and West Africa;
• a growing engagement in conflict mediation across certain African conflicts;
• the development of defence and security partnerships in the areas of armaments, military assistance and training, including counter-terrorism;
• the use of influence strategies through funding social, cultural, or religious programss, often through non-state subcontractors.

Beyond these salient features, the African policy of each of the six Middle Eastern powers considered here has its own specificities, which this article aims to highlight.

Turkey

The Ottoman Empire has long-established relations with sub-Saharan Africa, notably through its settlements that later became Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan.

After the advent of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and during the Cold War, Turkey tended to align its African foreign policy with that of the United States, without paying particular attention to the continent. It was not until the late 1990s that Ankara showed a real interest in sub-Saharan Africa, which has since grown steadily. When Turkey’s EU membership application was rejected in 1997, the country began to view the potential opportunities in Africa in a new light.

In 1998, the Turkish authorities introduced an ’’Action Plan for an opening to Africa’’. However, it was with the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002 that an ambitious policy of cooperation with African countries was established.

In 2005, the Turkish government organized a “Year of Africa” [6] and Turkey became an observer member of the African Union. In 2008, the First Africa-Turkey Summit was held under the so-called “Strategic Partnership with the African Union”. Turkey has also established relations with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). However, Ankara prioritizes bilateral relations, offering its African partners a ‘third way’ based on a new form of non-alignment, in contrast to both Western powers and countries like China, India, and Russia. [7]. Another challenge for Turkey is containing the influence of Sunni Muslim countries it perceives as rivals, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With more than 40 visits (sometimes two per year), President Erdogan is the non-African leader who has visited the largest number of states on the continent. Seeking to exploit the historical, cultural and religious proximity of Turkey to the continent, in 2021, he described Africans as brothers and sisters of the Turkish people. This interest in Africa has been reflected by the increase in the number of Turkish embassies on the continent, from 10 in 2008 to 37 in 2021, while there are 37 African diplomatic representations in Ankara.

Through the Diyanet, its administration devoted to religious affairs, Turkey has financed the construction or restoration of mosques in Mali and Niger, but also in African states with a majority of non-muslim population such as Ghana. In the 2010s, cooperation between Turkey and Africa, which until now has been mainly focused on economic and humanitarian projects (especially in the construction and air traffic thanks to the very dynamic strategy of Turkish Airlines which provides an increasing number of internal and external routes with Africa), has taken a more political and safe dimension. The sales of Turkish weapons in Africa have thus particularly developed. Although Turkey’s share of the African arms market appears insignificant, with only 0.5%, it is well behind Russia, China, the US and France, its growth in arms exports is the largest on the continent. The year 2020-2021 is significant in this respect with an increase of 455%[11]. The particularly competitive price, as well as the speed of delivery and ease of use explain the attractiveness of the TB2 Bayraktar drones in African countries. Among the States that have acquired it are Togo, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Turkey also sells armoured vehicles, electro-optical sensor systems and surveillance systems to its African partners[12]. Turkish military equipment transactions with African countries are often accompanied by technology transfers and joint industrial development proposals, based on Turkey’s no-strings-attached policy, which imposes no conditions on the use of the equipment, unlike the US or France. In addition to the supply of arms, Turkey has 19 military attachés deployed in Africa[13] and has defence agreements with 30 African states[14] to strengthen bilateral military and technical cooperation. These agreements often involve training local armed forces, with a focus on counterterrorism and crime prevention. The country has provided $5 million in assistance to the G5-Sahel joint force.

Turkey has been accused by Saudi Arabia and the UAE of supporting local actors close to the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Qatar. In Libya, Turkey, along with Qatar, supported Fayez el-Sarraj’s regime in 2020 against General Khalifa Haftar’s offensive. Turkey also has a military base in Somalia (since 2017), the TURKSOM camp[16], which is the country’s largest infrastructure abroad. Sudan is also of particular interest to Turkey, which failed to complete the Suakin port project after the overthrow of its key partner, Omar al-Bashir [17]. However, Turkey may seek to continue its efforts to expand its presence on the Red Sea by aligning with al-Burhan, with whom it appears to have closer ties than with his rival, General Hemetti, who is supported by the UAE and the Wagner group.

Turkey, along with its NATO allies [19], has long been involved in maritime security around the Horn of Africa.. Since 2009, it has been participating in the Combined Task Force 151 off the Somali coast to combat piracy and secure maritime trade routes to the Red Sea.

Israel

The Jewish state’s relations with the African continent have always oscillated between friction and normalization. The immediate post-war period of the Second World War was marked by a short period of cordial relations between some countries on the African continent and Israel, gradually recognized by several states, the first of which was Ghana on the eve of its independence. In the early 1970s, Israel had diplomatic relations with 33 countries on the continent. However, friction with African states increased after the 1967 Six-Day War, which resulted in the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, and even more so with the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War in 1973. Most African states then decided to break off diplomatic ties with Israel, the only countries that maintained official relations being Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland [21]. The 1970s saw growing solidarity across Africa with Palestine[22], particularly through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the precursor to the African Union (AU). The OAU chose to sever all diplomatic ties with Israel in solidarity with Egypt, marking one of the few unified foreign policy decisions made by African states. In 2002, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted observer status as a non-member of the African Union (AU).

In the 1990s, relations between Israel and certain African countries improved slightly, as these countries sought to strengthen cooperation. Zaire (1982) and Cameroon (1986) [23] were the first countries to renew relations with the Hebrew state. The Oslo Accords have led most countries on the African continent to re-engage diplomatically with Israel, now recognized by 46 of the 54 countries on the continent.

However, the real rapprochement between Israel and some African countries began with Benjamin Netanyahu’s rise to power in 1999 and strengthened further when he returned to office in 2009. During his successive terms (1996-1999; 2009-2021; 2022-), particularly the last two, the Israeli Prime Minister has personally invested much in what he called a «return to Africa». After participating in Liberia in 2017 at the 51st ECOWAS Summit, B. Netanyahu even mentionned considering “closing some diplomatic representations […] abroad to open new ones in Africa”[26], demonstrating its commitment to strengthening ties with the continent. Netanyahu’s strategy also relies on developing personal ties with the leaders of certain states that have maintained relations with Israel since the 1970s, or with others who once supported the PLO. In West Africa, Ghana, Togo and the Ivory Coast are particularly close partners. In East Africa, as demonstrated by Netanyahu’s 2016 tour, English-speaking countries with Christian majorities—such as Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda—are considered privileged partners. Indeed, Israel also directs its foreign policy towards the growing number of Christian and evangelical communities in Africa [27].

Rwanda developed close relations with Israel in the wake of the 1994 genocide, although an Israeli embassy was only opened in the country in 2019. Israel was also one of the first countries to recognize South Sudan’s independence. Since 1967, Israel had maintained strained relations with Sudan, which had supported Egypt in the Six-Day War and remained hostile until Netanyahu met with General Al Burhan in 2020. In the civil field, the work of MASHAV, the Israeli agency for development cooperation, focuses mainly on capacity building in the areas of agriculture, water and health. While Israel is not directly involved in military operations on the African continent, arms trade – especially in the field of light weapons, missiles, drones and retrofitting of Soviet aircraft and tanks – remains a major element in its security cooperation with Africa. Key partners include Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon and Ethiopia.

Israel’s military sales to the continent are mostly made by private Israeli companies but they are promoted and coordinated by the Department of International Defence Cooperation (SIBAT) of the Ministry of Defense. Israeli intelligence cooperation in Africa plays a key role, involving Mossad services and increasingly shifting towards privatization and outsourcing, particularly in cybersecurity. Israel has developed close cooperation in this area with Uganda and Ethiopia. Additionally, private military companies, often led by former Israeli soldiers and specializing in security equipment manufacturing or event security services, have recently proliferated to assist in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa and West Africa. Moreover, the Israeli armed forces have been heavily involved in training the forces of some African states. Historically, the most significant example is that of Cameroon, whose president Paul Biya called on Tel-Aviv’s support for the formation of the famous «Rapid Intervention Battalion» (BIR), inspired by the IDF model and whose format has been emulated in many African armies: this elite unit of the Cameroonian army was created in 1999 by Abraham Avi Sivan[29], a former commander of several units of the Israeli army.

For several decades, Israel has worked to facilitate the immigration of African Jews, particularly the Falashas from Ethiopia. However, in the 1990s, it also developed a policy to limit the influx of non-Jewish African refugees, primarily from Sudan and the Horn of Africa, as their numbers grew. In 2012, the Knesset amended the 1954 Infiltration Prevention Act allowing the expulsion of Palestinians, and to allow for the detention of Eritreans and Sudanese who have arrived illegally in Israel for three years from their arrival. However, this amendment was later revised to limit detention to 20 months following a Supreme Court decision. Besides, in recent years, Israel has sought political agreements with Rwanda and Uganda to repatriate African refugees to both countries, though these efforts were abandoned following international public condemnation..

More generally, over the years, large numbers of African workers have replaced Palestinians in low-skilled jobs in agriculture, construction and catering.

Israel has also faced setbacks in its diplomacy with Africa, notably the cancellation of the 2017 Israeli-African summit in Lomé and the failed attempt to join the African Union as an observer member, a move challenged by disagreements among AU member states: while two-thirds of the countries on the continent voted in favor of this status, Israel’s rejection as an observer member of the AU was primarily due to Algeria and South Africa. It is interesting to note in this regard that South Africa has always taken a stand against the Jewish state in the political sphere since the end of the apartheid regime, with which Israel had maintained relations of discord[32]. Since the ANC came to power, South Africa has been a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause, as evidenced by its complaint against Israel before the International Court of Justice.

A number of countries traditionally do not recognize Israel: Algeria, Tunisia, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Djibouti, Somalia, the Comoros. When the UNGA voted on resolution ES-10/L22 in 2017, condemning any action to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, only Togo took a stand against the resolution, thus expressing its full support for Israel. In 2018, only seven countries on the continent (Rwanda, South Sudan, Eritrea, Malawi, Liberia, Lesotho and Cape Verde) voted in favour of the US resolution condemning Hamas as a terrorist group. Similarly, the majority of sub-Saharan African states reacted late and cautiously following the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas [34]. Israel’s traditional allies strongly condemned the attacks (Kenya, DRC, Togo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Cameroon), while many other countries adopted a neutral stance, calling for de-escalation, and others refrained from commenting. Many have aligned themselves with the position of the African Union, which has not called Hamas’ action terrorist but has insisted on a two-state solution to the conflict.

Saudi Arabia

Since the 1970s, and particularly after the 1979 Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic network has been notably dense in the Muslim-majority countries of West and East Africa. Historically focused on containing the expansion of Shiism in Africa, Saudi Arabia has, in recent years, also been increasingly concerned with countering the growing influence of its Qatari rival.

Saudi Arabia maintains close ties with the African Muslim countries, millions of whose citizens make annual pilgrimages to the holy sites of Islam. Issuing visas for pilgrims has become a powerful tool of foreign policy on the continent. Saudi Arabia also invests in the education of African Muslim scholars by providing them with scholarships to study at the kingdom’s leading universities (Islamic University of Medinah, Umm Al-Qura University and Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University). Many African Ulema and Imams have been trained in a Wahhabi approach to Islam for more than three decades. Upon their return, many have held prominent positions, often in mosques built with funds from Riyadh or more widely within state religious institutions. As such, they wield considerable influence in their respective states, both politically and socially.

The loans or grants made by the Saudi Development Fund (SDF) have also benefited Africa, which received an average of 50% of the funds disbursed, for projects mainly focused on road, water, health and school infrastructure. The main beneficiaries of this assistance were Egypt, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Gabon, Senegal and Mauritania. The Saudi organization “International Islamic Relief Organization” (IIRO), one of the first Islamic charities, has also been very active in Africa.

Multilateral frameworks, including functional ones, have also been used as vectors of influence for Saudi Arabia on the African continent. This is particularly evident with the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) based in Jeddah and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which now includes six African members: Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea [41]. More recently, Saudi Arabia has been increasingly involved in mediating and negotiating the resolution of African conflicts. The signing of the Jeddah peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018 was a major step forward in its African policy. After more than 20 years of conflict, the signing of this agreement by the leaders of both countries is seen as a great success for Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi kingdom, like Qatar, has also worked to normalize relations between Djibouti and Eritrea in their conflict over the SAR-Doumeira border. In Libya, Saudi Arabia has essentially confined itself to political support for General Khalifa Haftar, without providing him with equipment unlike the UAE. It also committed to funding the G5 Sahel, which was headquartered in Mauritania, one of Saudi Arabia’s main partners in Africa, particularly since its deteriorating relations with Qatar. In 2019, following the protests that ousted Omar El-Bashir, Saudi Arabia focused its efforts on Sudan, in collaboration with its UAE ally. In 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted talks to bring together Generals Al Burhan and Hemmeti [44].

In the area of security and defense, Saudi Arabia has remained relatively uninfluential on the African continent. However, it has made significant efforts to secure military bases in the Horn of Africa. In 2017, Saudi Arabia negotiated an agreement with Djibouti to establish a military base, which is particularly important for its operations in the context of the war in Yemen. Strategically located near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, at the entrance to the Red Sea, this military base has yet to be constructed. While Saudi Arabia’s allies in the war against the Yemeni Houthis, the UAE, were given access to the Eritrean port of Assab, which served as a key base for their operations before the Emirati withdrawal, Saudi Arabia’s African ambitions were more clearly demonstrated at the first Saudi-Africa summit in 2023. [45]. 

Qatar

Qatar’s influence in Africa is relatively recent. For a long time, the NGO Qatar Charity remained the main symbol of Qatari presence in many African countries. Historically, Qatar’s main partners in sub-Saharan Africa were Mauritania and Sudan, both of which established diplomatic relations when Qatar gained sovereignty in 1971. Qatar also hosts a significant number of nationals from these countries, some of whom hold positions in the emirate’s administration in areas such as police and justice. However, the fall of Omar El Béchir in 2019 distanced Sudan from Qatar, particularly halting Qatari projects aimed at rehabilitating the port of Suakin, a project that would have allowed Turkey, a close ally of Qatar, to establish a military base there, much to Egypt’s displeasure.

Between 2000 and 2020, Qatar opened embassies in various African countries, and many African embassies were also established in Qatar. Among the African nations that developed special ties with Qatar during this period are Nigeria and South Africa, with agreements particularly in the gas energy sector.

Qatar’s increasing influence on the continent is also due to its ideological-religious diplomacy, which has often supported political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood, serving as a counterbalance to Saudi Wahhabism. During the embargo imposed on Qatar from 2017 to 2021, the country focused on asserting itself against its regional rivals, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both of whom had urged African countries to sever diplomatic ties with Doha. When the crisis erupted, countries like Mauritania, Gabon, Djibouti, the Comoros, Senegal, Chad, and Niger recalled their ambassadors from Qatar or cut off relations. This situation made Qatar realize that the African continent could no longer be ignored.

However, Qatar’s approach was not to demand exclusive relations. Many West African countries, such as Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal, chose to remain neutral, presenting an opportunity for Qatar to form new alliances. In 2017, Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani visited six of these West African countries to express his appreciation for their neutrality or for quickly re-establishing relations with Doha. On the other hand, some African nations, including the Comoros, Eritrea, Mauritania, and Mauritius, clearly sided with Saudi Arabia and the UAE

However, the stakes are particularly high for Qatar in the Horn of Africa. Doha, which once mediated in the border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea, withdrew its peacekeeping troops from the border region in 2010 after the two countries chose to align with Saudi Arabia. Following this, the Eritrean army took control of the area, while Saudi diplomacy worked to help normalize relations between Djibouti and Eritrea (see above). The blockade imposed on Qatar has also forced the country to seek new sources of supply, shifting its disputes with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to Somali territory. In its pursuit of strategic points for its operations in Yemen, the UAE reached an agreement in February 2017 with Somaliland to establish a naval base in Berbera, a deal they were unable to secure in Djibouti. Somaliland is staunchly pro-Abu Dhabi, and Puntland also called on the UAE to maintain its presence in its semi-autonomous region. Although Somalia officially remained neutral during the Gulf crisis, it suspended its military cooperation with Abu Dhabi, denouncing what it saw as a violation of its sovereignty. As the UAE was accused of supporting the division of Somalia, Qatar responded by supporting the country’s unity and stability, as Somalia appeared to be the only state in the region maintaining a pro-Qatari stance amid the UAE-Saudi alliance. Ethiopia, meanwhile, sought to balance its relations between the two rival blocs.

Over the years, Qatar has also become a key mediator in various African political crises. In addition to its involvement in the Djibouti-Eritrea conflict, Qatar has been actively engaged since 2008 in the mediation of the Darfur conflict in Sudan. Negotiations between the Sudanese government and the main rebel group, the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM), were held in Doha, leading to a “memorandum of understanding.” Qatar’s involvement positioned it as a significant and trusted actor in the peace process.

Furthermore, Doha played a crucial role as a mediator in Chad’s internal political-military conflict, which resulted in an agreement between the Military Transition Committee (CMT), led by Mahamat Idriss Deby, and various rebel factions, alongside the establishment of a National Dialogue.

In other areas, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have often supported opposing sides. In Libya, for example, Qatar was actively involved in the military campaign to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Qatar, along with Turkey, also supported the Government of National Unity led by Fayez Al Sarraj, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed Marshal Haftar’s forces.[52].

Qatar is now seeking to expand its role as a mediator in the Sahel region. For a long time, Algeria and Mali maintained close ties, but in 2023, they experienced deep disagreements, particularly regarding the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, as well as the resurgence of clashes between Bamako and separatist groups in the north of the country. As Algeria’s ally, Doha proposed to mediate the reconciliation process between Mali and Algeria. Qatar also offered to strengthen bilateral relations with Mali.

Additionally, Qatar’s news channel, Al Jazeera, has a significantly broader reach across the African continent compared to other regional broadcasters like Sky News Arabia (funded by Abu Dhabi) and Al Arabiya (backed by Riyadh). Through Al Jazeera, Qatar has the ability to directly engage with African civil societies, which are playing an increasingly influential role in the continent’s political landscape.

The United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has longstanding ties with the African continent. However, it was only about 15 years ago that a clear UAE strategy for Africa began to take shape. Between 2010 and 2020, nine new UAE embassies were opened across Africa. Initially driven by Dubai and focusing on economic priorities such as infrastructure and agriculture, the UAE’s African policy was redefined as part of Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy adjustments following the 2011 Arab Spring. Since then, the UAE’s policy has also focused on political and military matters.

During the crisis with Qatar between 2017 and 2021, the UAE conditioned its investments and development aid in Africa on the explicit support of African states for its strategic positions. The lack of approval or neutrality was viewed as a tacit endorsement of the Qatari stance.

The UAE’s African policy also reflects the broader international strategy of Mohammed bin Zayed, with a central focus on combating political Islam. Tensions between Abu Dhabi’s ruling family and the local Al Islah movement, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, have shaped this policy. As a result, Abu Dhabi has supported African partners who oppose political Islam, particularly those challenging groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. This has led to strong ties with the armed forces of such countries. For instance, Abu Dhabi has become a key ally of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and played a significant role in Sudan, where it influenced President Omar al-Bashir’s shift from Iran to the Gulf monarchies. After al-Bashir’s fall in 2019, the UAE immediately provided support to the Transitional Military Council (TMC), which included Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who had overseen Sudan’s involvement in Yemen, and Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemetti, whose paramilitary “Rapid Support Forces” (RSF) had also been deployed in Yemen. Since the outbreak of war between the two leaders, the UAE seems to have shifted its support more toward General Hemetti [58].

In addition to securing its supply routes via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, establishing anchorages for military deployment, and organizing its operations against Houthi forces in Yemen since 2015, Abu Dhabi has sought to strengthen its partnerships with countries in the Horn of Africa, particularly Eritrea and Somaliland. The UAE’s strategy aims to ensure its presence along the Red Sea coasts and throughout the Horn. Leveraging the Emirati giant DP World, the UAE is involved in building ports and naval bases in the region. In response to Djibouti’s reluctance to meet its demands, Abu Dhabi turned to Eritrea, securing a 30-year concession for the port of Assab and the construction of a landing strip. The UAE also gained access and construction rights in Somaliland at the Berbera port, with an Emirati diplomatic representative appointed to Hargeisa. This rapprochement with Somaliland has significantly strained relations with Somalia. In 2018, Somalia accused Abu Dhabi of illegally transferring funds to Somaliland’s security forces, and in 2021, it alleged the UAE orchestrated a disinformation campaign to undermine the Somali electoral process. In response, the UAE suspended its diplomatic relations and halted financial contributions to Somalia’s development.

Beyond its traditional influence in the Horn of Africa, the UAE is also working to position itself as a key mediator in African conflicts. For example, it played a role in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Since January 2021, Abu Dhabi has been involved in mediating the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over the Nile waters. In Libya, the UAE has been conducting air operations alongside Egypt since 2014 against Islamist groups allegedly supported by Qatar. Later, it provided discreet logistical and air support to Field Marshal Haftar’s forces. The UAE has also increasingly positioned itself in West Africa, such as supporting Guinea’s President Alpha Condé before his ousting by a military junta. Its involvement is particularly evident in the Sahel region, especially in Mauritania and Chad. Mauritania, like Sudan, deployed troops to Yemen during the early stages of the war and aligned itself with the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi axis during the 2017 Qatar boycott. Nouakchott had previously accused Doha of funding terrorist groups in Mali as early as 2013. The close ties between the UAE and Mauritania were reaffirmed after General Mohamed Ould Ghazouani came to power.

In addition, Abu Dhabi financed the construction of a military base, Camp Mohammed Bin Zayed, near the Mauritanian capital. This facility houses the Mauritanian staff school and the G5 Sahel Defence College. The UAE quickly expressed its support for the establishment of the G5 Sahel and its joint force, committing to finance it with a contribution of 30 million dollars in 2018. This backing for the G5 Sahel aligns with the Emirati strategy to combat Islamist movements. The UAE also maintains a privileged relationship with Chad, despite the country’s ambiguities in the dispute with Qatar. The UAE was swift in supporting the Transitional Military Council, led by Mahamat Idriss Deby, the son of the late President Marshal Idriss Déby, who ascended to power in violation of constitutional provisions. This stance toward Chad fits into the broader context of Emirati involvement in Sudan and Libya. Furthermore, the UAE is now working to strengthen ties with the military elites currently in power in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

Iran

In the 20th century, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi established a distinct African policy for Iran, including nuclear cooperation with South Africa and the development of an Iranian maritime presence in the Indian Ocean and along the East African coast. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has sought to export its revolutionary ideology to Africa, primarily based on anti-imperialist rhetoric, denouncing both US dominance and the existence of Israel. As early as the 1980s, Tehran opened embassies across the continent, particularly to limit the influence of Iraq, with which it was in conflict from 1980 to 1988. More broadly, Iran has been highly active in countering the influence of rival Middle Eastern powers in the Horn of Africa, particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia. It has established ties in the region through the Pasdaran (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). Despite this, Iran’s presence has remained relatively modest. President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who led the country from 1989 to 1997, played a key role in strengthening relations with Africa, notably through a rapprochement with Sudan under Omar al-Bashir, who was isolated due to an international embargo.

Closer ties were also established with countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Comoros in East Africa; Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Niger, and Cameroon in West Africa; and post-apartheid Zimbabwe and South Africa in Southern Africa. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency from 2005 to 2013, Iranian organizations like the Organization for Islamic Culture and Relations (ICRO) were reportedly used as fronts for the covert activities of the Al-Quds Force. However, a diplomatic disengagement was observed under President Hassan Rouhani. Iranian diplomacy has often supported educational institutions, cultural centers, humanitarian organizations, and mosque construction across the continent. Iran has also worked to mobilize African states in multilateral forums, seeking to gain votes in its favor at the UN, particularly on resolutions related to its nuclear program. Another key objective has been to counter Saudi and Israeli influence in Africa.

However, the large predominance of Sunni Islam and the limited presence of Shiism on the African continent have restricted Iranian influence. Nigeria, a priority country for Iranian diplomacy, is a notable exception due to its sizable Shiite community, estimated at around 12% of the country’s Muslim population. This percentage has grown significantly since the 1980s, when Shiism had a relatively marginal presence. Iran has also leveraged its African policy through networks of Lebanese Shiite communities, some of which are close to Hezbollah, notably in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. While the model of the Islamic Revolution may have attracted some Africans, conversions to Shiism have generally been limited and, in some cases, provoked clashes with traditional Sunni groups, particularly in Nigeria and Cameroon. Despite these tensions, Cameroon remains a partner of Iran, which provides security assistance programs. Iran has also been accused of helping circumvent U.S. sanctions by transferring oil products.

Under President Raisi, Iran appears determined to continue expanding its presence and influence on the African continent. The export of its drones to the African market presents another opportunity for Iran, and it has signed a drone agreement with Ethiopia. Iran has also strengthened its ties with the Sahel countries, where military regimes took power in Mali in 2020, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023. These regimes have embraced nationalist rhetoric and denounced Western imperialism. Iran’s presence is particularly prominent in Mali, where relations have been bolstered both bilaterally and through civil society engagement. The military regime in Burkina Faso announced the reopening of its embassy in Tehran after over twenty years of closure, and a joint Burkina Faso-Iran cooperation commission was established. Iran has also expressed willingness to cooperate with Niger. In this region, synergies may develop between Russian forces (increasingly present since December 2021) and Iran, allies on other international fronts, notably in Ukraine and the Levant. President Raisi himself praised the resistance of African countries to colonialism and terrorism, while the Iranian Foreign Minister emphasized the injustice of international sanctions against the Sahelian countries, drawing a barely veiled parallel with the sanctions imposed on Iran

CONCLUSION

In recent years, Africa has become the scene of rivalry between Middle Eastern countries, often driven by their respective interpretations of Islam, a powerful influence on a continent where Islam is rapidly growing. These Middle Eastern actors are sometimes motivated by geostrategic interests or by the desire to gain support in the context of conflicts that either oppose them or tear them apart. The Horn of Africa, geographically close to the Gulf, has emerged as the primary region in Africa to which these countries direct their foreign policies. Securing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the corridor leading to the Suez Canal across the Red Sea is a critical concern for them. However, these countries have also sought to expand their areas of influence to other parts of the continent.

While these Middle Eastern powers often push for explicit support from African states, they frequently encounter resistance. Most African countries are hesitant to take sides, demonstrating a preference for maintaining their independence in geopolitical matters. While geopolitical alliances have occasionally formed, it appears that African states remain determined to retain control over the geopolitical dynamics of their own continent.

[1] Between the 16th and 19th centuries, several million Africans were deported to the Middle East and India by Arab slavers.

[2] The 16th century saw the creation of the province of Habesh, which includes parts of the present-day Eritrean and Somali states. Pouvreau Ana (2020), “Turkey in the Horn of Africa”, Conflicts: Geopolitical Review: www.revueconflits.com/turkey-in-the-horn-of-africa/

[3] “Sudan was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire from 1820 to 1885 but, contrary to the historiographical tradition which refers to the “Turkish” period in this regard, it is more accurate to report an “Egyptian-Ottoman” occupation.” to the extent that the Turkish element took only a very modest part in the history that knew then this African region marginal in the empire of the sultans of Constantinople, at the time when it is already «the sick man» whose powers are watching over the death of a man who is judged to be inevitable.”: www.clio.fr/chronologie/pdf/pdf_chronologie_soudan.pdf  [5] In the 1990s, however, Turkey participated in several UN peacekeeping operations in Africa (in Sierra Leone, Somalia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and even took command of UNOSOM II between 1993 and 1995.

[4] Kaya K. and Warner J. (2013), Turkey and Africa: A Rising Military Partnership?, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office.

[5] In the 1990s, however, Turkey participated in several UN peacekeeping operations in Africa (in Sierra Leone, Somalia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and even took command of UNOSOM II between 1993 and 1995.

[6] Turkish-African Relations / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (mfa.gov.tr): www.mfa.gov.tr/les-relations-entre-la-turkiye-et-l_afrique.fr.mfa

[7] Donelli Federico (2021), Can Turkey-African Relations Withstand Ancara’s Currency Crisis? , ISPI: www.ispionline.it/en/publication/can-turkey-african-relations-withstand-ankaras-currency-crisis-32779

[8] www.rfi.fr/en/afrique/20230513-between-africa-and-turkey-a-partnership-that-takes root

[9] www.tccb.gov.tr/en/actualit-s/1861/116453/-we-see-the-African-peoples-as-our-res-and-s-with-whom-we-share-a-common-destiny-shared

[10] www.la-croix.com/Religion/In-Africa-Turkey-play-card-islam-2021-09-20-1201176335

[11] Yaşar, Nebahat Tanrıverdi (2022), Unpacking Turkey’s Security Footprint in Africa, SWP 2022/C 42: www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022C42/

[12] Hairsine, Kate, and Burak Ünveren (2022), Turkey Deepens Its Defense Diplomacy in Africa, www.dw.com/en/turkey-deepens-its-defense-diplomacy-in-africa/a-63586344

[13] www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/africa-and-turkey-consolidate-their-military-trade-idyll/20221103135957158922.html

[14] Aksoy, Hürcan Aslı et al. (2022), Visualizing Turkey’s Activism in Africa, Centre for Applied Turkey Studies.

[15] Armstrong Hannah (2021). Turkey in the Sahel, International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org/en/africa/sahel/turkey-sahel

[16] Turkey sets up largest overseas army base in Somalia | News | Al Jazeera: www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/1/turkey-sets-up-largest-overseas-army-base-in-somalia

[17] Alhassan, Abubakar (2021). Turkey’s Ambitious Plans for Africa. Geopolitical Futures : geopoliticalfutures.com/turkeys-ambitious-plans-for-africa/

[18] www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230913-soudan-le-général-al-burhan-rencontre-le-président-turc-à-ankara

[19] Turkey’s membership in NATO helps to enhance its attractiveness to African states, as it is seen as a guarantee of high standards for training and weapons provided by Ankara.

[20] Gidron, Yotam (2020), « Israel in Africa: Security, Migration, Interstate Politics, », African Arguments, London: Zed.

[21] ISRAEL PARMI LES NATIONS : Afrique (embassies.gov.il)

[22] Onana Jean-Baptiste (2000), « L’Afrique, les Palestiniens et Israël : système à double entente », Outre-Terre, (n^o 14), p. 393-401. DOI : 10.3917/oute.014.0393. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre1-2006-1-page-393.htm

[23] Bishku, Michael B (2021), »Israel and the Francophone Central African States of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cameroon: The Development of Long-Term Relationships with Autocrats. » The Maghreb Review, vol. 46 no. 1, p. 3-22. Project MUSE, https://doi.org/10.1353/tmr.2021.0022.

[24] Nouhou Alhadji Bouba (2018), Offensive diplomatique d’Israël en Afrique, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) : www.frstrategie.org/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/offensive-diplomatique-disrael-afrique-2018

[25] Hochet-Bodin Noé (2023), “Le cas israélien divise à nouveau l’Union africaine,” : https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/202 3/02/20/le-cas-israelien-divise-a-nouveau-l -union-africaine_6162543_3212.html

[26] www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/israel/diplomatie-defense/147001-170604-netanyahou-au-liberia-pour-resserer-les-liens-d-israel-avec-l-afrique

[27] The World Christian Database estimates that Pentecostals represent 12% of the African population, or about 177 million out of 400 million Christians.

[28] Augé Benjamin (2020), “Israel-Africa Relations: What Can We Learn from the Netanyahu Decade?”. Ifri Studies, Ifri. November 2020:  www.ifri.org/en/publications/studies-de-lifri/israel-africa-relations-what-can-we-learn-netanyahu-decade . It should also be noted that, following the logic of supporting the “Abraham Accords”, Donald Trump’s United States pushed in Africa for bilateral agreements with the Jewish state, as evidenced by the condition, in 2020, to withdraw Sudan “the list of states supporting terrorism in exchange for a normalization of relations” between Khartoum and Israel”.

[29] www.jeuneafrique.com/193707/politique/l-isra-lien-qui-prot-geait-biya/

[30] Gidron 2020, 139.

[31] www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/politique-africaine/le-sommet-entre-israel-et-des-pays-africains-annule-par-le-togo_3059017.html

[32] Lissoni, Arianna (2011), “Africa’s ‘Little Israel’: Bophuthatswana’s Not-So-Secret Ties With Israel.”, South African Review of Sociology, 42 (3): 79–93.

[33] www.courrierinternational.com/article/genocide-devant-la-cour-internationale-de-justice-l-afrique-du-sud-sonne-la-charge-contre-israel

[34] Le Gouriellec Sonia (2023), Israël-Hamas : les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne dans la guerre de Soukkot | Le Grand Continent : legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2023/10/20/israel-hamas-les-pays-dafrique-subsaharienne-dans-la-guerre-de-soukkot/

[35] Gresh Alain (1983), L’Arabie Saoudite en Afrique non arabe. Puissance islamique ou relais de l’Occident ? – Persée (persee.fr) : www.persee.fr/doc/polaf_0244-7827_1983_num_10_1_3644  

[36] Duteil Mireille (2016), Géostratégie – Arabie saoudite-Iran : le duel africain (lepoint.fr) : www.lepoint.fr/afrique/geostrategie-arabie-saoudite-iran-le-duel-africain-26-01-2016-2012961_3826.php

[37] www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230110-les-fidèles-africains-saluent-la-levée-des-quotas-pour-le-pèlerinage-à-la-mecque

[38] Bregand Denise (2009), « Du soufisme au réformisme : la trajectoire de Mohamed Habib, imam à Cotonou », Politique africaine, n° 116, p. 121-142. DOI : 10.3917/polaf.116.0121. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2009-4-page-121.htm

[39] Augé Benjamin (2020), La politique de l’Arabie Saoudite en Afrique : vecteurs et objectifs | IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales : www.ifri.org/fr/publications/editoriaux-de-lifri/lafrique-questions/politique-de-larabie-saoudite-afrique-vecteurs

[40] Perouse De Montclos Marc-Antoine (2011), « Les ONG humanitaires islamiques en Afrique : une menace ou un bienfait ? », Sécurité globale, n° 16, p. 7-28. DOI : 10.3917/secug.016.0007. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-securite-globale-2011-2-page-7.htm

[41] Angola left the organization in 2023 :  : www.courrierinternational.com/article/economie-l-angola-claque-la-porte-de-l-opep-sur-fond-de-desaccord-sur-les-quotas-petroliers

[42] legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2018/09/23/lerythree-et-lethiopie-signent-un-accord-de-paix-historique-en-arabie-saoudite/

[43] www.adi.dj/index.php/site/Plus/6883

[44] www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/11/08/soudan-pas-de-progres-sur-un-cessez-le-feu-dans-les-pourparlers-en-arabie-saoudite_6198962_3212.html

[45] timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/772-sommet-arabie-saoudite-afrique-vers-la-redynamisation-d-un-axe-sud-sud

[46] Augé Benjamin (2016), La relation diplomatique entre le Qatar et l’Afrique subsaharienne. Une histoire en construction | IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales : www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/auge_qatar_afrique_oksl_0.pdf

[47] www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/767701/politique/qatar-arabie-saoudite-la-bataille-pour-lafrique/

48] www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/05/10/malgre-ses-efforts-en-afrique-le-qatar-ne-semble-pas-paye-de-retour_5460369_3212.html

[49] www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/6/18/why-did-qatar-leave-the-djibouti-eritrea-border

[50] www.jeuneafrique.com/1368057/politique/le-qatar-dans-le-grand-jeu-africain/

[51] www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/tchad/tchad-ce-qu-il-faut-savoir-sur-l-accord-qui-ouvre-la-voie-a-un-dialogue-national_5302132.html

[52] www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20111026-le-qatar-reconnait-son-implication-directe-intervention-libye   

[53] www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240110-le-qatar-médiateur-dans-la-résolution-de-la-crise-diplomatique-entre-l-algérie-et-le-mali

[54] Jean-Loup Samaan, « Les Émirats arabes unis en Afrique : les ambitions parfois contrariées d’un nouvel acteur régional », Notes de l’Ifri, Ifri, septembre 2021 : www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/saaman_eau_afrique_2021.pdf

[55] www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/04/12/de-l-egypte-au-mozambique-les-emirats-arabes-unis-a-la-conquete-des-ports-d-afrique-de-l-est_6169254_3212.html

[56] International Crisis Group (2019), Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact, Middle East Report, n° 206 : www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula-horn-africa-turkiye/intra-gulf-competition

[57] www.africaintelligence.fr/le-continent/2022/05/25/les-premiers-chefs-d-etat-africains-appeles-par-mohammed-bin-zayed-tout-juste-devenu-president,109787039-art

[58] www.liberation.fr/international/afrique/soudan-qui-sont-les-parrains-etrangers-de-la-guerre-civile-20231228_EGWPLXEKANHOTHXIOFQ5DJ3AXY/

[59] It is also on the Assab base that Yemeni forces supported by Abu Dhabi are said to have been trained by the UAE Presidential Guard.

[60] K. Hassan (2021), « Egypt Weighs UAE Mediation Initiative in Nile Dam Crisis », Al Monitor : www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/03/egypt-weighs-uae-mediation-initiative-nile-dam-crisis

[61] One of the sons of late President Idriss Deby Itno, Zakaria Idriss Deby, held the first post of Chadian ambassador to Abu Dhabi in 2017.

[62] N’Djamena initially supported the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi axis against Qatar, which is hosting Timan Erdimi, the late President Deby’s nephew at the head of the Union of Resistance Forces, one of the main opposition movements. However, after the suspension of its diplomatic relations with Doha in 2017, Chad finally sent an ambassador back to the country a year later.

[63] www.jeuneafrique.com/1408895/politique/pourquoi-abou-dhabi-simplique-discretement-au-sahel/

[64] Iran first forged links with East Africa through the slave trade from the African continent to the Persian Gulf. As a result of this painful history, there is an African-Iranian community in Iran. B. A. Mirzai, « African Presence in Iran: Identity and Its Reconstruction », Outre-Mers. Revue d’histoire, n° 336-337, 2002, p. 229-246.

[65] Clément Therme, « Les ambitions iraniennes en Afrique. Une présence idéologique, sécuritaire et économique », Notes de l’Ifri, Ifri, décembre 2022 : www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/therme_ambitions_iran_afrique_2022_final.pdf

[66] A. Mohammad Abdulhalim (2018), « Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Influence in Africa Intensive Interventions and Challenges », Journal For Iranian Studies, vol., n° 6, p. 109.

[67] Voir R. Bagheri et E. Lob (2022), « Rouhani’s Africa Policy: Disengagement, 2013–2021 », Middle East Policy, vol. 29, n° 1, p.154-173

[68] G. M. Feierstein (2017), « The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry », The Middle East Institute: www.mei.edu

[69] Elsewhere on the continent, the percentage of Shiites is 21% for Chadian Muslims, 20% for Tanzania and 8% for Ghana. According to a study by the Pew Research Center and Y. Trofimov, “With Iran-Backed Conversions, Shiites Gain Ground in Africa. The Growth of Shiite Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa Is Occurring as the Muslim World Becomes Polarized Along Sectarian Lines,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 May 2016, available at: www.wsj.com ,  cited by Clément Therme, ibid.

[70] C. Jungman et D. Roth, « December 2021 Iran Tanker Tracking and Year Review », UANI, 3 janvier 2022, disponible sur : www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com

[71] « Ayatollah Raisi: Iran’s Cooperation Potential with the African Continent Will Be Pursued with Utmost Determination », Irna, 6 août 2021, www.irna.ir.

[72] www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2021/08/17/is-ethiopia-flying-iranian-made-armed-drones/

[73] A été signé un protocole d’accord (MoU) pour la mise en place d’une commission mixte de coopération Iran-Mali. Voir « L’Iran accorde la priorité à la coopération avec le Mali dans tous les domaines (Amirabdollahian) », IRNA, 23 août 2022, disponible sur : https://fr.irna.ir . Par ailleurs, au Mali, où le Conseil national de transition (CNT) a annoncé, le 3 janvier, l’ouverture, durant l’année à venir, de « deux facultés de l’université d’Iran », « une technique et professionnelle et un centre d’innovation informatique » tandis que les deux pays se sont engagés à « renforcer les liens de coopération à travers la défense et la sécurité ». Voir Morgane Le Cam, Au Sahel, l’Iran en pleine offensive diplomatique (lemonde.fr) : www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/01/09/au-sahel-l-iran-en-pleine-offensive-diplomatique_6209852_3212.html

[74] mondafrique.com/politique/mali-larrestation-de-linfluenceur-pro-hezbollah-ben-le-cerveau/

[75] The Iranian President also toured Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe in July 2023.

[76] blog.sciencespo-grenoble.fr/index.php/2022/03/15/quand-les-puissances-du-moyen-orient-exportent-leurs-rivalites-dans-la-corne-de-lafrique/

[77] MOURAD Hicham, « La ruée sur la mer Rouge », Confluences Méditerranée, 2019/3 (N° 110), p. 205-223. DOI : 10.3917/come.110.0205. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-confluences-mediterranee-2019-3-page-205.htm