Chloé Jamet, Associate Researcher, Institut FMES

Assessing the stability of a Middle Eastern country is always an arduous task. This article, written at the end of a long stay in the country, is not intended to predict the future, but to highlight the various factors that could tip Jordan over the edge, as the resumption of hostilities on its doorstep and the rise in regional tensions since October 2023 raise fears of a collapse of the Kingdom. Despite the war in Gaza and its impact on regional stability, Jordan is trying to maintain a semblance of the status quo. Regional dynamics, as well as the political and security challenges it faces, call into question its strategic positioning and limited room for manoeuvre. Negotiations on the future of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, in which Jordan no longer carries any weight, could push Jordan’s interests into the background. The country could therefore be perceived as an adjustment variable by the various parties, and emerge weakened or even destabilized by this umpteenth episode in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A deteriorating internal situation

Since the Nakba¹, which forced Jordan to accommodate a large Palestinian population on its resource-limited territory, and even more so since the “Black September” episode in 1970², the Jordanian state has perceived the Palestinian question as a potential source of destabilization. As a result of various waves of displacement (1948, 1967, Intifadas and the Syrian civil war³), more than half the population has Palestinian origins. Whether or not they hold Jordanian nationality, Palestinians in the Hashemite kingdom retain strong and intimate links with the other side of the Jordan River, and every political shock in the Palestinian territories has repercussions in Jordan. Since October 7, 2023, Jordanian society has been living to the rhythm of political and geopolitical developments around Gaza.

In addition to the cancellation of numerous celebrations and the consolidation of the “Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions” (BDS) movement targeting Israel in Jordan, weekly demonstrations take place in the city center in support of the Gazan population. Under the supervision of the Jordanian police and with few incidents of violence, these gatherings outside mosques on Fridays bring together activists of all political persuasions (Islamists, nationalists and liberals) and families with young children. Their slogans revolve around Western double standards, denouncing the « war crimes of Benyamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden », and calling for the creation of a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea”. These gatherings never go beyond the framework accepted by the authorities, and any form of open criticism of the King’s position is outlawed. However, calls to denounce the 1994 Normalization Agreement with Israel, as well as natural gas and trade agreements with Tel Aviv, can be heard in the streets of Amman.

In November 2023, Abu Obeida (spokesman for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, the military wing of Hamas) called on Jordanians to rise up⁴, but the Jordanian authorities were quick to frame the popular discontent: Queen Rania echoed the Arab street in an interview on CNN, denouncing the “Western double standard”. For his part, the King described the Israeli action in Gaza in October as a “war crime”.

These display measures, as well as the humanitarian airdrops to Gaza carried out in partnership with France and the setting up of field hospitals, are absolutely necessary in order not to aggravate the current protests in the country and prevent them from undermining the legitimacy of the government, which has been perceived by its own population as an ally of Israel since the Wadi Araba agreements in 1994.

The Jordanian authorities have also had to reinforce security at several points on their territory, such as the Israeli and US embassies, where demonstrators regularly gather, provoking clashes with the Jordanian police deployed to protect the diplomatic buildings. Although several demonstrators have been arrested for anti-regime slogans, the situation has never degenerated.

Demonstrators are also forbidden to go near the border to prevent any risk of escalation; the area is now tightly controlled thanks to the multiplication of checkpoints. Jordan has also taken advantage of a new cybercrime law, passed in August 2023, to ensure that online criticism by Internet users on its territory does not spark a new wave of uprisings, similar to the Arab Spring⁵.  According to Human Rights Watch, Jordanian authorities have arrested hundreds of people on the basis of their pro-Palestinian online activism, and four activists have been brought before a court⁶.

Another risk to the country’s internal stability relates to the population’s purchasing power. According to World Bank data⁷, the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea led to a 45% drop in the volume of imports and exports passing through the port of Aqaba, Jordan’s only access to the sea. The activation of alternative transport routes and the deployment of Western naval operations off the coast of Yemen limited the rise in prices paid by Jordanian consumers. Inflation has remained below the 2% mark since the start of the conflict, and is expected to rise to around 4% by 2022⁸. However, commodity prices have continued to rise, while Jordan’s minimum wage has remained unchanged, pushing more and more families into poverty.

This unfavorable economic dynamic has been reinforced by the collapse of tourism in Jordan (-70% of visitors according to the ministry concerned), particularly weakening the Bedouin tribes established in Wadi Rum and around Petra, who were already marginalized.

Israel’s questioning of UNRWA has also had a strong impact in Jordan. The UN agency provides services to around 2 million Palestinian refugees in the kingdom⁹. The cancellation of contributions by certain members of the international community has caused great concern in Jordan, as a prolongation of these cuts could plunge thousands of families into poverty by blocking the operation of 169 schools and 25 health centers. Jordan immediately called on its partners to pay their contributions or even increase them, which it succeeded in doing¹⁰. More generally, however, the conflict diverted the attention of the main NGOs and part of the international aid that Jordan was receiving, thus weakening the most vulnerable populations¹¹.

For the time being, Jordan has managed to contain the risks of internal instability. It remains to be seen whether the current situation will have an impact on the legislative elections scheduled for September 10, 2024. Jordan’s system of representation is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation, with the majority of representatives being tribal or community leaders¹². The only structured group is the Islamic Action Front (IAF), a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, which won 16 out of 130 seats in 2016, and only 10 in an alliance with another Islamic party in 2020. The IAF maintains ties (complicated despite their ideological proximity) with Hamas, an organization banned by King Abdullah in the country since 1999, but today perceived by a large part of the Jordanian population as the liberator of the Palestinians. The context could also encourage Jordanian voters of Palestinian origin, who tend to abstain, to vote more. The IAF could also take advantage of Hamas’ image of resistance, which would push the Jordanian regime to limit its success at the ballot box.

However, a new electoral law passed in 2022, creating a single proportional constituency, now reserves 30% of parliamentary seats for political parties. This should have the effect of limiting tribal logics, but could also favor the FIA. The results of the elections will therefore have to be carefully analyzed, even though the King retains most of the country’s power. While Jordanians are well aware of their country’s economic, social and democratic difficulties, they have not forgotten the chaos into which many of their neighbors are currently plunged. The younger generation is more concerned with leaving a country with 50% youth unemployment than with revolution, although the student elections at the University of Jordan raised fears of outbursts on the part of the government, which strictly supervised them. While the population’s desire for stability is a powerful factor in Jordan’s social status quo, it should not conceal the large number of challenges facing the country, illustrated a few years ago by the failed coup d’état of Prince Hamza, the King’s half-brother.

Moreover, in the long term, we may wonder about the impact of the war in Gaza on Jordan’s younger generation, who were subjected early and daily to images of indescribable violence via social networks, raising fears of a future radicalization of the population on the Israeli-Palestinian question.

While a destabilization of the “Arab Spring” type seems to have been averted for the time being, Jordan risks becoming the variable for geopolitical adjustments by its neighbors, in order to resolve the Palestinian question and allow normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, once the war in Gaza is over.

A tense regional context on which Jordan no longer has any influence

In recent months, the region has been marked by rapid strategic recompositions between Israel, Iran and its proxies (notably the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Yemeni Houthis), and Saudi Arabia. Against this backdrop, Jordan is struggling to make an impact, even though it has long been central to negotiations on the Palestinian question. With Hamas losing several of its leaders at the end of July, and Israel playing for time, diplomatic chancelleries are anticipating a regional conflagration.

A conflagration was averted in January 2024 when an American base along Jordan’s northern border was targeted for the first time by Iranian-backed Shiite militias, killing three American soldiers. Then, in April 2024, Iran’s launch of missiles and drones into Israel closed Jordanian airspace for several hours, forcing Amman, with the help of its Western allies, to intercept Teheran’s attacks. Jordan justified its reaction by the need to ensure its own security and protect its sovereignty and the inviolability of its airspace, while the Arab street called it “Israel’s best Arab ally”. This episode underlined Jordan’s geographically strategic position, which could become a third front in the scenario of an open war between Israel and Iran. Following the renewed escalation of regional tensions in August 2024, Amman this time publicly affirmed that it would remain neutral in the event of a new Iranian attack on Israel, with Iran implying that the country could become a target if it persisted in protecting Israel.

As a corridor between Iran and Israel, Jordan pays particular attention to Tehran’s attempts to interfere, so as not to be drawn into a regional escalation.Since 2004, the King has denounced the destabilization caused by the “Shiite crescent” that surrounds him to the west (Hamas), north (Syria and Hezbollah), east (Iraqi militias) and south (Houthis). In May 2024, the Jordanian authorities also denounced Iranian attempts to smuggle weapons into Jordan. While the country’s predominantly Sunni character limits Iranian influence in Jordanian society for the time being, it cannot be ruled out that public opinion manipulation campaigns led by Teheran and its Moscow ally, an expert in the field, may one day provoke the uprising that has not yet taken place.

While the international community fears a new escalation following the eliminations carried out at the end of July 2024 in Beirut and Teheran, Jordan seems powerless: situated between a rock and a hard place, its levers for action are limited by its reduced regional weight and, above all, its dependence on Israel, notably for its water supply (while water stress could in future be a factor of social destabilization)¹³. It will therefore be a collateral victim if a regional war breaks out.

Jordan, the adjustment variable in a regional settlement?

The war in Gaza is unlikely to be resolved before the American presidential election in November 2024. However, it is useful to look at the various solutions currently under consideration and their implications for Jordan.

In the long term, Saudi Arabia will probably be an important player in a political solution, which would also enable it to assert itself even more strongly on the regional scene, by showing itself to be the protector of the Palestinian people while at the same time obtaining normalization with Israel. Riyadh considers Jordan, the buffer zone for its northern border, to be the last island of stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia therefore pays particular attention to the neighboring monarchy, which it supports both politically and economically. But in the context of regional recompositions, Jordan could pay the price of an agreement between Riyadh and Washington.

Scenario 1: expulsion of West Bankers to Jordan

The main risk from the Jordanian point of view is that of a new mass population displacement.While Israel has accelerated its settlement policy in the West Bank in violation of international law and UN resolutions, some Likud and other Israeli right-wing party leaders see Jordan as an alternative homeland for Palestinians. The worst-case scenario for Jordan would therefore be a total annexation of the West Bank by Israel and the expulsion of the Arab population from the other side of the Jordan River. Indeed, Jordan is keeping a close eye on Rafah and Egypt, as it fears a precedent: if Gazans were expelled to Egypt, West Bankers could also be expelled across the Jordan. Jordanian officials have described such a scenario as a “red line”, a “fundamental violation of the peace treaty” signed with Israel in 1994, and “an act of war”.

The American presidential election in November could, however, lead to such an outcome: Donald Trump, who had the American embassy transferred to Jerusalem, if elected, might want to settle the issue quickly. In keeping with his transactional approach, and in line with his plan to cede Crimea and Donbass to Moscow to end the war in Ukraine, he would be capable of calling into question American financial support for Jordan if it refused to take in new Palestinian refugees. This scenario would be catastrophic for the monarchy, which is totally dependent on external financial support; Washington helps the Kingdom to the tune of $1.6 billion a year (including $500 million in military aid).

In short, a resolution of the conflict resulting in the expulsion of Palestinians to Jordan would usher in a period of unprecedented instability, requiring a huge investment by the international community to find a modus videndi. From the Saudi point of view, such a solution would have the disadvantage of weakening the country and allowing an Islamist pole of contestation to flourish on its border.

Scenario 2: Rewriting the maps of the Middle East

The question of moving beyond the two-state solution has also re-emerged. One option – admittedly unlikely, but already mentioned by Donald Trump during his last term in office – would be the disappearance of the Palestinian Authority and all claims to a Palestinian state, in favor of an “Arab Kingdom” comprising the West Bank and Jordan: this would be a return to the pre-1967 situation, disregarding Israeli colonialism, Palestinian nationalism consolidated since the Nakba and tensions between populations on both sides of the Jordan River since 1970¹⁴. Jordan has neither the natural, financial nor structural resources to absorb the West Bank. Arab reunification would have unpredictable consequences in terms of the distribution of power between the different components of this new society. From the Saudi point of view, it would represent a gamble. On the one hand, Riyadh could seize the opportunity to reinforce Amman’s vassalage towards it through massive financial support, making Jordan even more dependent than it already is; but on the other, it could give greater prominence to the Hashemites, historic rivals of the Sauds, thanks to increased development aid and humanitarian support from wealthy countries. In a third scenario, more worrying for the international community as a whole, the state could collapse, following in the footsteps of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.

Another map of the Middle East is also being considered. In the short term, Israel would like to delegate policing of the Gaza Strip to a multinational Arab force: while the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Morocco appear to be considering the option, Jordan is strongly opposed, not out of support for Hamas, but to avoid any appearance of collusion with Tel Aviv. In the longer term, however, with a view to rebuilding Gaza, Israel and the Gulf States may want to push Jordan to accept the “Gaza 2035” plan. Proposed by Benyamin Netanyahu, it aims to turn Gaza into a zone at the cutting edge of new technologies (electric cars, solar energy) and a hub for infrastructures linking the Near East to the Persian Gulf, in order to facilitate economic exchanges and the prosperity of the region, in line with the Abraham Accords¹⁵.

Jordan, as the interface between Israel and the Gulf monarchies, is a key component of this project. However, this project and that of the India/Middle East/Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) are fuelling criticism from Jordanian society. Should these projects go ahead in the absence of the creation of a Palestinian state, they could destabilize Jordan, despite the positive economic spin-offs for the country.

Scenario 3: the two-state solution or the risk of losing Al-Aqsa

The most desirable solution for all parties, the creation of a Palestinian state could, however, be synonymous with a loss of soft power for Amman. The Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock have been under Hashemite trusteeship since 1967. Jordan is responsible for its administration and the payment of civil servants’ salaries, giving it a certain prestige in the Muslim world. However, tensions are growing over Islam’s third holiest site, whether with Tel Aviv or Ramallah.

Saudi Arabia’s ambition is “religious normalization between Mecca and Jerusalem”: it could be tempted to offer to take over the administration of this holy site, in addition to the security guarantees and civilian nuclear program it is already demanding from the United States in exchange for normalization with Israel. Riyadh could justify this change in status quo by citing tensions between the Palestinians and the Jordanian government, and by promising broad financial support for a future Palestinian state under trusteeship. This development would represent a major loss of prestige and influence for Jordan.

There is another option: King Hussein of Jordan had promised to hand over responsibility for East Jerusalem to the Palestinians once a final Israeli-Palestinian agreement on Jerusalem had been reached. In this case, it would be difficult for Jordan to go back on its word. However, the Palestinian state will be weak, at least in its early years: Jewish extremists are unlikely to disappear, and will continue to want to pray on the Temple Mount. Such images could exacerbate instability in the Palestinian territories, Jordan and the region as a whole.

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The priority for Jordan is therefore to preserve the current status quo, as all other scenarios threaten Jordan (at least its soft power, at worst its borders and internal stability). In the meantime, the Hashemite kingdom is relying on its long-standing Western support, and on the King’s meetings with his American, French and British counterparts, all three of whom are very concerned by Jordan’s stability. But these efforts remain insufficient to influence the strategic upheavals underway in the Middle East: Amman will probably remain a spectator in the coming months, hoping not to suffer from a new regional order.

Footnotes:

1. Arabic term meaning “catastrophe”, referring to the 1948 Palestinian exodus following the creation of the State of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war.
2. On September 12, 1970, Hussein of Jordan launched military operations against the fedayeen of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, to restore the monarchy’s authority in the kingdom after several Palestinian coup attempts. The conflict resulted in several thousand deaths. In July 1971, Arafat and the PLO fighters were expelled from Jordan. This episode marked the first break between Jordan and the Palestinian leadership.
3. The outbreak of civil war in Syria drove not only Syrians to Jordan, but also Palestinians, now twice as many refugees and facing numerous socio-economic difficulties.
4. Middle East Monitor, 25/10/2023
5. L’Orient- Le Jour , 02/05/2024
6. Human Rights Watch
7. World Bank blog, 16/05/2024
8. Jordanian Department of Statistics, accessed August 2024.
9. Provoked by Israeli accusations about the participation of some of its employees in the October 7 terrorist attacks.
10. The Impact of the Gaza War on Jordan’s Domestic and International Politics, Curtis R. Ryan, 08/02/2024
11. European consulates in Amman recorded a significant rise in asylum applications from December 2023 (although such applications, based solely on economic hardship, are automatically refused).
12.             Al-Shark al-Awsat 19/07/2024, Anadolu 01/07/2024 et Al-Jazeera 25/04/2024
13. The impact of water shortages on national security in Jordan, Adrien J. 20/01/2024
14. While Palestinians are fairly well integrated in Jordan, differentiation phenomena persist.
15. The Jerusalem Post, 03/05/2024