By Aris Marghelis, Associate Researcher at FMES

Despite a lull with Turkey that has allowed it to emerge, since 2023, from a situation of political and operational tension that had become almost permanent, Greece is facing a simultaneous fracturing of its entire southern environment. This fracturing threatens to shatter the building built in recent years, on which its regional strategy and security are based: the profitability of its position as the first continental gateway to the EU on the Indo-Pacific route; partnership with Egypt and the management of the Libyan question; partnership with Israel and the momentum created by the Abraham Accords in the Middle East. How does Greece react to the testing of these three pillars?

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In the Red Sea

The severe disruption of maritime trade induced by Houthi strikes in the Red Sea led Greece, together with France and Italy, to take an active part in the launch. (February 2024) of Operation EUNAVFOR “ASPIDES” (the Greek word for “shields”), whose base of operations is located in Larissa, under the authority of a Greek admiral. In addition, the chance of the bearings makes that, since November, Greece ensures simultaneously the operational command of ASPIDES and IRINI.

From an economic point of view, ships of Greek interest are regularly targeted and, in general, the disruption of traffic threatens the maritime economy, which is very important for the country [1]. This complication comes on top of the limitation of the Greek merchant navy’s access to the juicy Russian market due to sanctions. On the other hand, despite a year that was going to be difficult because of the rerouting of container ships, Piraeus finally seems to pull out of the game to 2024 by continuing to record gains, and by overtaking Hamburg as a maritime hub [2]. This is due in particular to an increase in container traffic destined for Greece, which offsets the fall in transhipments. But also to the diversification of the port’s activities (increase in passenger, automobile and cruise ship traffic) and the presence of a robust ecosystem of maritime services.

Strategically, the operation is part of a broader vision. In particular, it is seen as a means of promoting European defence, a priority for Greece [3]; incidentally, it allowed to test in real situation – and with success – its anti-drone system of national manufacture KENTAVROS (“Centaure”) [4]. But ASPIDES is also seen as necessary to supply the Baltic-Aegean energy, military and economic corridor that is emerging from the Ukrainian conflict and whose viability also depends on its connection with the Indo-Pacific.

Thus, compromising maritime traffic of Western interest in the Red Sea makes it possible to disrupt the Baltic-Indo-Pacific arc, for the best interest of Tehran against a backdrop of Turkish ambivalence and strong American suspicions about Russia’s alleged support for the Houthis [5]. This explains, among other things, the choice of the Anglo-Americans to intervene more quickly and dynamically than the Europeans [6], whose response seems anemic, even though the way in which ASPIDES was conceived and is conducted may have aroused criticism [7].

From a navigational point of view, ships continue to prefer the contour of Africa, more expensive, more polluting, but safer. From a political point of view, the weak mobilization at the European level reflects a lack of interest, or even a lack of commitment to strategic issues, if not an aversion to risk [8]. Initially aligned with the operation, Belgium and Germany finally withdrew; it remains to be seen whether the Houthis “direct threats against German shipowners [9] will influence Berlin’s wait-and-see approach. For its part, Spain immediately renounced a military presence in the Red Sea [10]. This attitude is in line with Madrid’s pro-Palestinian stance [11] which, moreover, is traditionally limited to the “trade union minimum” in terms of solidarity with its European partners on East Mediterranean issues. In addition, Spanish ports have seen their activity increase sharply due to the situation in the Red Sea.

This mission has therefore become a Franco-Greek-Italian affair, which limits both its operational scope and its political impact within the EU. Deployed for one year, a more complete assessment can only be made later.

Greece faces the Egypt-Libya-Turkey triangle

The conflict in Gaza and developments on the Libyan issue have confirmed Egypt’s pivotal role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the ANMO region. However, this role is evolving in parallel with the weakening of the country.

First, endemic economic fragility, accentuated by an international situation that impacts the trade [12], energy and food circuits on which Egypt depends. Hence the conclusion of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in March 2024 [13] and the appointment of a new Finance Minister familiar with the IMF and the World Bank [14]. In parallel, Saudi and Emirati financial support continues [15] but may not be eternal in times of regional and internal recompositions from which the Gulf monarchies are not immune [16].

By extension, Egypt suffers from a social, and therefore potentially political, fragility. Egypt’s young and large population lacks prospects. The experience of the Muslim Brotherhood, circumscribed but not eradicated, as well as Cairo’s stance on the conflict in Gaza, which is not in line with the dominant popular sentiment, makes a dynamic of subversion plausible.

Egypt is a vital partner for Greece.

If the Turkish push in the Eastern Mediterranean has so far been contained, it is also thanks to the Hellenic-Egyptian synergy in energy and military matters, which continues [17]. Incidentally, the failure of this Turkish attempt at forcible passage reminds us that the format of a navy, the modernity of its equipment and the audacity of its crews are not enough. They are not combined with a fair assessment of the capabilities of the adversary and regional realities. Nevertheless, the Turkish naval acquisition program [18] suggests that Ankara maintains its strategy of staggering by quantity, even if it means temporarily calming the game to delay.

Egypt is also an “airlock” from Greece to Libya. Despite efforts made since 2020 (media reception of Kh. Haftar in Athens in early 2020; opening of a consulate in Benghazi, reopening of the embassy in Tripoli and visit of K. Mitsotakis in 2021; an unfortunate rescue operation in September 2023 during the floods in Derna [19]), Athens does not manage to weigh in the Libyan equation, yet essential for its interests. Indeed, Turkish entrenchment in Libya is a real strategic “Swiss knife,” hence the fact that it is consensual in a Turkey that is politically polarized, including on issues of foreign policy conduct. It allows Ankara to access the central Mediterranean, ultimately promoting the structuring of cooperation with Italy on Libya, but also a projection to the rear of Greece, against the backdrop of a flourishing Turkish-Albanian strategic relationship [20] at a time when relations between Athens and Tirana are experiencing disturbances. It is no coincidence that Greece has announced its intention to acquire a fourth IDF Belh @ rra and to equip three of its four new ships with naval cruise missiles capable of striking at 1000 km [21]. This would allow it to exercise deterrence over larger areas by avoiding the trap of an overextension that would become untenable in the face of the format of the Turkish naval tool. Finally, a permanent anchor in Libya allows Turkey to open up to the Sahel, and, combined with a growing footprint in the Red Sea, to constrain Egypt’s regional projection. And that is precisely what is coming.

In a new crisis over the distribution of oil revenues between rival factions [22], Turkey is seeking to further consolidate its presence in Libya. First, by trying to establish links with the east of the country. But especially by getting closer to Egypt, including in the Somali theater. Indeed, in 2024 Mogadishu signed security agreements with Turkey [23] and Egypt [24], allowing Egyptian military equipment to be sent to Somalia after several decades [25]. This is actually part of the Egyptian-Ethiopian dispute, whose water security issue is experienced as existential by Egypt. In the aftermath, 12 years after his last visit, Al-Sisi was received with great pomp in Ankara, where he nevertheless reiterated the need to see the departure of “illegitimate foreign forces and mercenaries” from Libya [26], to which the Turkish president did not react. If Egypt is not fooled by Ankara’s plans – which has not renounced any of its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and is not letting go of Libya – the Somali-Ethiopian dimension of this rapprochement cannot be underestimated, including the fact that the United States supports Turkish involvement in Somalia [27]. However, a Turkish-Egyptian synergy in Somalia that would allow Cairo to strengthen its position against Addis Ababa could end up impacting the Egyptian posture in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya in a direction potentially unfavourable to Greece. This is even though the EU does not have a solid common position on the Libyan issue and Turkey continues to refuse the checks carried out as part of Operation IRINI [28].

From the point of view of illegal immigration, Egypt is also a key country for Greece, due to the turn taken by the conflict in Gaza (and now in southern Lebanon) [29], and the Libyan situation which is not improving. Crete, whose strategic value has increased considerably in recent years, as well as Gavdos – which is one of the islands that Turkey considers to be of “undetermined status” – have been receiving since the spring 2024 thousands of migrants from Egypt and Libya.

A strong Egypt capable of maintaining a course of events in Libya compatible with Greek concerns is therefore essential; on the contrary, its collapse would be a geopolitical earthquake for the whole region and very bad news for the EU, Israel and the United States. Hence a series of initiatives, some of which involve Greece, to try to consolidate the country and maintain its compatibility with the Western strategic device.

At the bilateral level, the establishment of a Greek-Egyptian High Cooperation Council was agreed in March 2024 [30]. At the regional level, the Cyprus-Greece-Egypt partnership was reconfirmed the day after Al-Sisi’s visit to Ankara [31]. At the European level, Greece has actively promoted the establishment of a strategic and comprehensive Euro-Egyptian partnership [32].

Financed to the tune of 7.4 billion euros over four years [33], it was doubled by military assistance of 20 million euros under the European Peace Facility with a view to ” (…) strengthen the capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces in terms of territorial control, thus improving their ability to respond to security threats throughout Egyptian territory, in particular in the western region “[34]. Moreover, it was the former Egyptian ambassador to the EU who replaced Sameh Shoukry in Foreign Affairs, suggesting a desire for Euro-Egyptian rapprochement. Finally, the difficulties facing US diplomacy in the Middle East have forced Washington to disregard its stated principles and unconditionally release $ 1.3 billion in military aid [35], confirming Cairo in its strategic “too big to fail” comfort zone.

Greece faces the Cyprus-Israel-Turkey triangle and as a backdrop to the American game

The détente between Greece and Turkey continues and the two governments maintain a rhetoric towards a resolution of their dispute. The exclusion of a former Greek Prime Minister from the ruling party for accusing the government of succumbing to Turkish pretensions, as well as the resignation of the Director General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs who denounces secret diplomacy and a lack of information by his hierarchy on the content of Greek-Turkish contacts (to the point, in his view, of being put at odds with foreign counterparts seeking information on the process under way), suggest that the current rapprochement could be something more than a temporary (and convenient) appeasement for both sides. And this, even though a few incidents have allowed Ankara to recall that lull is not worth retreating, especially in relation to Greece’s desire to create natural parks in the Aegean Sea [36], to the laying of the Great Sea Interconnector electric cable (funded by the EU) to link Greece to Cyprus and Israel and, in general, to the spatial planning advocated by the EU in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean [37]. At the same time, the integration of Turkish maritime geopolitical doctrine into textbooks [38] confirms the desire for transgenerational acculturation to revisionism, an element considered worrying by Greece, but also by the European Commission [39]. The change of command of the 4th Turkish Army (or “Aegean Sea Army”) is also noteworthy.

Posted facing the Greek islands, this formation has the largest landing force in the Mediterranean and is not integrated into NATO, precisely because it targets another member of the Alliance. However, Turkish opposition media in exile have pointed to this development as worrying Greece because of the pedigree of the new commander. Head of military intelligence from 2017 to 2019, General Irfan Ozsert would be one of the anti-Atlanticist officers loyal to R. T. Erdogan and would be specialized in clandestine operations, especially in Libya where he would have orchestrated the transfer of Syrian jihadists [40]. Regarding illegal immigration, Turkish smugglers have increased the level of violence (use of firearms, direct attacks on Greek patrol boats), while extending their activity along the maritime border to force the dispersal of forces. The trap is twofold: either, by increasing the level of violence, hope for a blunder, at a time when the Greek coastguard is in the sights of NGOs, with the support of images provided by Turkish reconnaissance drones; or prevent them from responding proportionally to precisely avoid any blunder and its politico-media consequences. In both cases, the aim is to restrict their ability to stop boats at the limit of the territorial waters where the Turkish authorities are obliged to come and recover them under the agreements. The strategy is obvious and the role of the Turkish authorities in this scheme can be questioned, despite the continuation of consultations between Greek and Turkish coastguards. Indeed, while the “truce” is generally respected in the air, the European Commission reports an increase in violations of Greek territorial waters by Turkey compared to 2023, as well as an increase in 172% of illegal arrivals, particularly by sea, while they are falling 58% in neighboring Italy [41]. Finally, a growing number of violent incidents involving the Turkish mafia in Greece should be noted. This testifies to a porosity that questions, even more, when one knows the long tradition of interpenetration between mafia and nationalist circles in Turkey – which dates back to the Kemalist era – and that members of these groups joined Greece as migrants and requested the right of asylum by presenting themselves as supporters of the PKK or the brotherhood of the late F. Gulen [42].

To this must be added the impasse on the Cyprus issue. Indeed, the island is each day a little more overwhelmed by its own strategic value, leading to more polarization. Thus, Turkey maintains its position in favor of the recognition of the breakaway republic of the north of the island, which Greece refuses to discuss, as contrary to the resolutions of the Security Council and the framework of negotiations set by the UN, which advocates a model of bizonal and bicommunal federation. At the same time, Cyprus proved useful for Israel, which earned it direct threats from the late H. Nasrallah, [43] but also from Turkey, which warned Greece and Cyprus against their involvement in the Middle East conflict. [44] That said, this involvement is also linked to British sovereign bases on the island, over which Nicosia – which denies any military contribution to the Middle East conflict – has no jurisdiction.

Finally, Cyprus continues its integration into the American strategic framework. Evolving in parallel with uncertainty about Turkey’s strategic loyalty to the West [45], this American-Cypriot cooperation is experiencing a new boom at the end of J. Biden’s term, with the signing of a defence agreement [46], followed by the start of the strategic dialogue between the two states [47] and the visit of the Cypriot President to the White House, the first since 1996 [48]. This turn of events naturally displeases Ankara [49]. However, Turkish-American relations have precisely entered an interesting phase.

At the lowest since the advent of J. Biden, they have rebounded since the beginning of 2024. However, this improvement actually confirms the grip of the United States on Turkey, especially via the vector of air power, a pattern in which Greece holds a prominent place.

Indeed, it was the United States that finally had the last word on the question of the sale and modernization of F-16 to Turkey, when it threatened to deliver F-35 to Greece without unblocking the F-16 if Ankara did not lift its veto on Sweden’s accession to NATO. In such a configuration, a Greece with 30 Rafales, 83 Viper F-16 and 20 – or even 40 – F-35 by the end of the decade would have had quite a substantial operational advantage for years to come. Turkey therefore first validated Swedish membership, before the White House sent Congress its request for the release of the F-16. A process facilitated by the de facto neutralization – and timely – of Democratic Senator Menendez [50], emblematic figure of the blocking of the delivery of Turkish F-16 by the Congress. Once this breach of F-16 opened, the circles of the State Department that continue to hope for a Turkey in the Western fold tried to exploit the dynamic by putting the delivery of F-35 back on the table if Ankara renounced Russian S-400 [51]. However, such a scenario would be the very negation of the logic of Turkish strategic autonomy, hence the denial that such negotiations are under way [52]. In addition, the development of the national fighter KAAN and the desire to acquire 40 Eurofighter [53], and the establishment of a joint squadron with Qatar consisting of Turkish F-16 and Qatari Rafale and Eurofighter [54], show that Turkey is seeking to loosen the American grip on its air force, but also to counterbalance the advantage provided to the Hellenic Air Force by the acquisition of the Rafale and the F-35, and which may have raised the serious concerns of the Turkish strategic analysis community.

Even more symptomatic of Turkey’s difficulty in marking its territory vis-à-vis the Americans, a joint naval exercise in the eastern Mediterranean was concealed by the Turkish Ministry of Defence [55], probably because it was in complete dissonance with the dominant discourse. Especially since the American ships involved would have anchored in Cyprus and participated in supporting Israel, two red rags for Ankara – at least theoretically. Added to this are rumors that the Kurecik radar base was used to counter the Iranian missile attack on Israel in April, rumors necessarily denied by R.T. Erdogan [56], even if Iran was never fooled as to the purpose of these facilities [57].

The accumulation of these contradictions between speeches and actions has not escaped the attention of certain nationalist factions which, warmed up by the rhetorical escalation of the conflict in Gaza, attempted to lynch two American soldiers in the Izmir region [58].

This picture finally reveals the difficulties inherent in Turkey’s posture. Caught up by the realities of its neighbourhood and its economy, and by the limits of its strategic empowerment, it cannot bet on a post-Western world with the same confidence as other actors of the “Global South,” contrary to the orientations advocated by the Turkish Eurasian/” South-globalist “circles that have gained influence in recent years. However, the great power discourse she has formulated over the years with her internal audience and a certain extra-Western international clientele forces her to conceal these limits, even if the decision of the BRICS to grant it only observer and not member status suggests that the leaders of the “Global South” are also aware of the nature of the Turkish game. This ambiguity is also reflected in the relationship with Israel where, over time, Turkish rhetorical aggressiveness turns out to be largely a smokescreen.

Indeed, diplomatic relations with Israel continue, despite Israel’s characterization as a “terrorist state.” Moreover, it is more B. Netanyahu than Israel that is targeted by R. T. Erdogan, who knows that sooner or later he will have to restore correct relations with the Jewish state. On the one hand for economic reasons, even if, still contrary to the official discourse, Turkish-Israeli trade is not stopped but goes through third states (including Greece) or is camouflaged in trade with the Palestinians. This is evidenced by the multiplication of actions carried out by pro-Palestinian activists in Turkish ports against ships suspected of trading with Israel [59]. On the other hand for strategic reasons: a solid positioning in the Eastern Mediterranean requires for Turkey good relations with Tel Aviv. However, the Israeli choice to engage in a partnership with Greece and Cyprus is paying off and – with nuances – unanimous in the Israeli strategic thinking community. In essence, one side hopes one day to reconnect with Turkey while maintaining the partnership with Greece and Cyprus, which is not seen as opportunistic; another part, more intransigent, even evokes an “alignment” with Greece and Cyprus in a logic of decoupling with Turkey [60]. However, the more this partnership – particularly in its security and operational dimension – deepens, the more difficult it will be for Turkey to unravel it in the future. It is probably no coincidence that the strike on the port of Hodeidah in July 2024, which is a very demanding operation because of the distances to be covered (about 4000 km round trip), as well as the strikes against Iran in the autumn, which engaged a hundred Israeli planes, were preceded by exercises conducted with the Hellenic Air Force. The latter involved precisely many aircraft (in one case, no less than 56 Greek F-16 were mobilized) and carried out long-range strikes and in-flight refueling [61]. More generally, Israeli pilots say they are satisfied with their training in Greece in recent years, both because of the performance of their Greek colleagues and the morphology of the country – especially the Peloponnese – which evokes that of Iran (mountainous terrain, snow-covered ridges in winter).

Moreover, in an exchange during an online event with the former US ambassador to Turkey, D. Satterfield, he expressed confidence in the resilience of the Abraham Accords, especially in the perspective of seeing Saudi Arabia sign a defense agreement with the United States, one of whose demands will be the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. On the other hand, he recognizes that the war in Gaza has increased the price of this normalization, which requires the revival of a two-state solution.

From these elements, it follows that Turkey is still unable to find a role commensurate with its ambitions in the Middle East and can neither dethrone Egypt and the Gulf monarchies in managing the conflict in Gaza, nor exploit the situation to bury the Abraham Accords.

In the end, Ankara is haunted by the unbearable hypothesis of a resumption of American control over Turkish strategy in the eastern Mediterranean. Attempts to engage its neighbors on a bilateral basis are aimed at avoiding U.S. involvement, at least while waiting to see the intentions of the new administration.

However, D. Trump’s first term was not easy for R. T. Erdogan, despite the fact that the temperament of the two men and their penchant for transactionalism facilitated their direct communication. It was indeed under D. Trump and M. Pompeo that Turkey was ejected from the F-35 program, whereas harsh sanctions have been imposed on its defence industry [62], that it has been reframed within NATO for its aggressiveness towards Greece and its collusion with Russia [63], that the Abraham Accords were signed, and that Congress passed the “East Med Act” [64] and blocked the delivery of Turkish F-16 under the cross-partisan impulse of Senators Menendez (Democratic Party) and Rubio (Republican Party) who also supported the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. And if, despite Greek hopes, Mr. Pompeo (who had been approached for the Department of Defense) was not retained by D. Trump, it was Mr. Rubio who was appointed as the future head of the State Department, while Tulsi Gabbard, who, in the past, spoke warmly towards Greece and frankly against Erdogan’s Turkey [65], was appointed as head of intelligence. If previous positions do not postulate their repetition, the new Trump administration nevertheless reserves many unknowns for Ankara. Indeed, if it applies an even more pronounced pro-Israel policy and revives the strategy of maximum pressure on Iran, the cost of the Turkish posture on the conflict in Gaza – which has remained relatively low in the Turkish-American relationship [66] – could increase. Moreover, in a context of rising tensions on the Kurdish question in Turkey, American choices in Syria will be critical for Ankara, which is not unrelated to the turn that the Russian-American relationship will take. Here too, if D. Trump decides to restore direct contact with V. Putin (which is likely), or even to loosen the grip of sanctions (which is less obvious but not impossible), Turkey will see its dual role as mediator and hub for circumventing sanctions – and therefore part of its geopolitical rent – reduced.

Thus, while Athens – rightly or wrongly – is confident that the Trump administration will not fundamentally change its approach to Greece (given the trans-partisan nature of US support, which it also sought to confirm even before the elections [67]), Turkey faces greater uncertainty.

Perhaps this is one of the explanations for Ankara’s choice to maintain the dynamic of détente with Athens in order to avoid an additional imponderable, which, in turn, leads Greece to believe that perhaps this is a rare opportunity to go beyond a mere lull in terms that would be acceptable, the whole being favored by a context of political domination of the ruling party unprecedented since 1974. From this point of view, the way in which the Trump mandate will influence the Turkish position could bring about changes.

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In the end, the further development of the relationship with the United States, the search for greater EU involvement in the major strategic and security challenges of Europe’s south-eastern flank, the defusing of Turkish pressure, and the pursuit of its military modernization remain for Greece the main tool box to deal with a fragmentation of its southern environment which, in the event of inaction, could have extremely harmful consequences for itself and for the EU.

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[1] Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS): “The contribution of shipping to the Greek economy,” 2023; Eurostat: “Water transport employed 297 000 people in 2023,” 25/06/2024.

[2] Baltic Exchange: “Xinhua-Baltic International Shipping Center Development Index Report,” 2024, pp. 14-16.

[3] Greek Ministry of Defence: “Meeting of the Minister of National Defence Nikos Dendias with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and Joint Visit to the HQ of Operation” ASPIDES “(OHQ EUNAVFOR ASPIDES) at the 1st Army/EU- Ο HQ” ACHILLEAS, “” 05/07/2024; Greek Prime Minister: “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis” interview on CNN with journalist Julia Chatterley, “13/07/2024.

[4] “Centaur: The New Combat-Proven C-UAS System By Hellenic Aerospace Industry,” Naval News, 18/07/2024.

[5] “Iran utilizes Turkey as a support hub for Yemeni proxy the Houthi rebels,” The Nordic Monitor, 11/01/2024; “Russia, Turkey, Iran Condemn Attack on Yemeni Houthis,” Voice of America, 12/01/2024; “US officials concerned Israeli offensive on Hezbollah could drag in Russia,” Middle East Eye, 28/06/2024; “U.S. Launches Effort to Stop Russia From Arming Houthis With Antiship Missiles,” The Wall Street Journal, 07/19/2024; “Exclusive: US intelligence suggests Russian military is advising Houthis inside Yemen,” Middle East Eye, 02/08/2024; “Russia Provided Targeting Data for Houthi Assault on Global Shipping,” The Wall Street Journal, 24/10/2024;

[6] “Who Are the Houthis and Why Did the US and UK Launch Strikes on Them?,” Voice of America, 12/01/2024; “US says B-2 bombers attacked Houthi targets in Yemen,” Aljazeera, 17/10/2024; “UK, US carry out air strikes on Yemen, including Sanaa,” Aljazeera, 10/11/2024.

[7] For example, interview with Admiral Pascal Ausseur (FMES) to B2: “ASPIDES. A purely defensive operation that solves nothing. Forgotten geopolitical issues, “08/04/2024.

[8] “German Navy Confirms Its Supersized Frigate Will Avoid The Red Sea,” The War Zone, 04/11/2024.

[9] “Houthis Attempting to Intimidate and Threaten German Shipowners,” The Maritime Executive, 18/11/2024.

[10] “Spain will not intervene in Red Sea – defence minister,” Reuters, 12/01/2024.

[11] “” From the river to the sea: “Israel condemns Spain’s deputy PM’s comments,” Anadolu Agency, 23/05/2024; “Spain-Israel tensions soar as Madrid throws support behind Palestine,” Al Jazeera, 06/06/2024.

[12] “Egypt’s Suez Canal Revenues Fall Over Regional Tensions,” The Shipping Telegraph, 10/10/2024.

[13] “Egypt signs expanded $8 trillion loan deal with IMF,” Reuters, 06/03/2024; “IMF Sends $820M to Egypt After Successful 3rd Loan Review,” Egyptian Streets, 30/07/2024.

[14] “Egypt overhauls cabinet as economic pressures, power cuts persist,” Reuters, 03/07/2024.

[15] “Egypt announces $35 trillion UAE investment on Mediterranean coast,” Reuters, 23/02/2024; “Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund Set to Invest USD 5 Billion in Egypt,” Egyptian Streets, 17/09/2024.

[16] See Pierre Razoux: “Strategic reconfigurations in the Middle East,” Defense, Union-IHEDN, No. 219, March-April-May 2024.

[17] General Information Organization of the Egyptian Presidency: “Chief-of-staff of Armed Forces witnesses main phase of MEDUSA-13 in Greece,” 22/10/2024.

[18] Turkish Presidency: “We must have a strong and effective navy in order to live in peace on our lands,” 24/08/2024.

[19] “Libya: Greek rescuers among those killed in road collision,” BBC, 18/09/2024.

[20] “Turkey, Albania upgrade ties to strategic partnership,” Anadolu Agency, 07/01/2021; Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Ankara, Minister Xhaçka: Türkiye is a key partner for Albania and the entire region,” 02/11/2022; “Albania signs deal to acquire three Turkish Bayraktar drones,” Reuters, 12/20/2022; “Berisha: Turkey” intervened “in 2009 Greece-Albania maritime deal,” Euractiv, 21/12/2022; “Greece annoyed by Albania-Turkey drone deal,” euractiv, 22/12/2022; “Turkey, Albania agree on defence, environment, media,” SeeNews, 21/02/2024; “Albanian premier: Unforgettable helpful acts by Türkiye cemented its support for Albania, Kosovo,” Anadolu Agency, 20/02/2024; Mission of Albania to the EU: “Minister Hasani meets Hakan Fidan: Let’s further strengthen the Albania-Turkey strategic partnership,” 04/07/2024; “Albania to get kamikaze drones from Turkey – PM Rama,” Reuters, 10/10/2024; “President Erdoğan inaugurates largest mosque in Balkans,” Daily Sabah, 10/10/2024.

[21] “Greece wants to acquire fourth IDF and naval cruise missiles,” Sea and Marine, 20/09/2024.

[22] “Libya’s oil output falls more than half due to political standoff,” Reuters, 29/08/2024.

[23] “Somalia authorised Turkey to defend its sea waters in” historic “deal,” Middle East Eye, 21/02/2024.

[24] “Somalia, Egypt sign defense pact to bolster security cooperation,” Anadolu Agency, 14/08/2024.

[25] “Egypt sends arms to Somalia following security deal, sources say,” Reuters, 29/08/2024.

[26] Egyptian Presidency: “President El-Sisi’s Speech at Joint Press Conference with Turkish President Erdoğan,” 04/09/2024.

[27] US State Department: “Joint Statement from the Somalia V,” 03/10/2024.

[28] “Libya: Turkey Denies Inspection of Operation Irini for Twelfth Time,” Agenzia Nova, 10/09/2024.

[29] “European Mediterranean states discuss Middle East, migration,” France24, 11/10/2024.

[30] “Greece and Egypt to deepen ties, forming High-level Cooperation Council,” Athens-Macedonian News Agency (AMNA), 17/03/2024.

[31] Egyptian State Information Service: “Egypt discusses with Greece, Cyprus preparations for 10th trilateral summit,” 06/09/2024.

[32] “PM Mitsotakis:” The stability and prosperity of Egypt is of critical importance to the EU, “” NAMA, 17/03/2024.

[33] European Commission: “Press statement by President von der Leyen with Austrian Chancellor Nehammer, Belgian Prime Minister De Croo, Cypriot President Christodoulidis, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, Italian Prime Minister Meloni and Egyptian President El-Sisi,” 17/03/2024.

[34] Council of the European Union: “European Peace Facility: Council adopts assistance measure to support Egyptian armed forces,” 05/11/2024.

[35] “US grants Egypt $1.3 trillion in military aid, overriding rights conditions,” Reuters, 12/09/2024.

[36] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “No: 58, 9 April 2024, Regarding Greece’s announcement on the creation of a marine park in the Aegean Sea,” 09/04/2024; Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the communiqué issued yesterday by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 10/04/2024.

[37] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “No: 235, 16 November 2024, Regarding Maritime Spatial Planning of the European Union,” 16/11/2024.

[38] “Blue Homeland” debuts at Turkish schools, “Kathimerini, 13/09/2024.

[39] European Commission: “Turkiye 2024 report,” 30/10/2024, p. 31.

[40] “The new commander of Turkey’s Aegean Army signals potential trouble for Greece, NATO allies,” Nordic Monitor, 15/08/2024.

[41] European Commission: “Turkiye 2024 report,” 30/10/2024, pp. 55 and 39.

[42] “Turkish mafia posing hybrid threat,” Kathimerini, 16/09/2024.

[43] “Hezbollah chief Nasrallah threatens Israel, Cyprus if Gaza war spills over,” France24, 19/06/2024.

[44] “Turkey warns Greece and Cyprus to avoid Middle East conflicts,” Kathimerini, 25/06/2024.

[45] “US partially lifts three-decade-old arms embargo on Cyprus,” France24, 02/09/2020; “Turkey condemns U.S. decision on Cyprus arms embargo,” Reuters, 17/09/2022; “American Fighter Jets Fly Over Turkish Occupied Cyprus,” Greek Reporter, 26/10/2022; “New Jersey National Guard signs Partnership Agreement with Republic of Cyprus National Guard,” U.S. Embassy in Cyprus, 30/03/2023; “Turkey lashes out at US over warship anchored in Cyprus,” Al-Monitor, 18/05/2023; “2023 U.S.-Republic of Cyprus Defense and Security Cooperation Dialogue,” U.S. Department of Defense, 01/06/2023; “Turkey to raise Cyprus issue at Nato summit,” Cyprus Mail, 19/06/2023; “Lifting of Defense Trade Restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus for Fiscal Year 2024,” U.S. Department of State, 18/08/2023.

[46] US Department of Defense: “U.S.-Republic of Cyprus Roadmap for Bilateral Defense Cooperation,” 10/09/2024.

[47] “US and Cyprus launch a strategic dialogue to bolster security,” AP News, 23/10/2024.

[48] “Christodoulides at the White House – U.S. President Expresses Support for a Solution to the Cyprus Issue,” The National Herald, 10/31/2024.

[49] “Turkey condemns US-Cyprus defense deal, urges Washington to” reconsider, “” Al-Monitor, 11/09/2024.

[50] “Sen. Bob Menendez guilty of taking bribes in cash and gold and acting as Egypt’s foreign agent,” AP News, 17/07/2024.

[51] “US Open to Turkey F-35 Talks If Dispute Over Russian Air Defenses Is Resolved,” Bloomberg, 30/01/2024.

[52] “Türkiye rebuffs claims of proposal to keep S-400s” in boxes “for F-35s,” Daily Sabah, 29/08/2024.

[53] “Germany says Britain taking lead on possible Eurofighters for Turkey,” Reuters, 19/10/2024.

[54] “Qatari-Turkish joint squadron to boost interoperability, training and security: Experts,” Breaking Defense, 28/08/2024.

[55] “Unraveling the undisclosed US-Türkiye naval exercise,” Yetkin Report, 26/08/2024.

[56] “Erdogan denies Turkish radars used in effort to down Iranian missiles headed for Israel,” Times of Israel, 26/04/2024.

[57] “Iran: NATO radar in Turkey serves to protect Israel,” Ynet, 10/05/2011.

[58] “Two US Marines assaulted by Turkish nationalists,” Reuters, 03/09/2024.

[59] “Guards fire into the air during protest at port against docking of Israeli ship,” Turkish Minute, 01/11/2024; “Video: Turkish Pro-Palestinian Protestors Stage Sit-In on German Cargo Ship,” The Maritime Executive, 04/11/2024.

[60] For example: “As Tensions Escalate in the North, Israel’s Hellenic Alignment Becomes Ever More Important,” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), 08/09/2024; “What many Westerners don’t get about the Gaza war,” JISS, 16/09/2024.

[61] “Air Force stages major drill in Greece practicing potential long-range strike on Iran,” The Times of Israel, 14/09/2023; Hellenic Air Force: “Co-training Between HAF and Israeli Air Force,” 31/05/2024.

[62] US State Department: “The United States Sanctions Turkey Under CAATSA 231,” 14/12/2020.

[63] “In Parting Shot, Pompeo Rebukes Turkey at NATO Meeting,” Reuters, 12/14/2020.

[64] Foreign Relations Committee: “Congress Passes Menendez-Rubio Bill Reshaping U.S. Policy in Eastern Mediterranean,” 20/12/2019.

[65] See, for example: his 2019 speech to the Greek-American community; ” Tulsi Gabbard slams “Islamist megalomaniac” Erdogan over Syrian proxies, “i24, 31/10/2019;” Trump’s incoming Director of National Intelligence: “Erdoğan is not our friend,” “Medya News, 11/15/2024.

[66] “Turkey is anchored in the West despite split on Gaza, US envoy says,” Reuters, 12/06/2024. [67] “Greek PM Mitsotakis Meets with U.S. Senators on Crete,” The National Herald, 10/05/2024.