By Pascal Ausseur, Managing Director, FMES Institute
Published by Le Grand Continent, May 18, 2025 : https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/05/18/leurope-a-decouvert-de-la-solitude-strategique-au-test-de-la-violence/
As it has expanded, the Union has also let down its guard. While it seems to have awakened from its post-historic slumber, it must quickly respond to direct and targeted violence against it from the East, and to the rise of dangerous resentment in the South. Reintegrating risk, developing military capabilities, rethinking politics : Admiral Pascal Ausseur proposes a survival guide for Europe.
We are caught off guard. At the end of the Cold War, Europeans as a whole were comforted in their neo-Kantian vision of building a world where norms and trade would have made war impossible. They believed that the momentum inspired by the Founding Fathers in the aftermath of the Second World War would gradually spread, not just to their own neighbourhoods, but eventually to the whole planet. A post-historical world was coming into being, rendering obsolete the belligerent concepts of nation, religion and balance of power.
Events proved them wrong, and they embarked on an about-face to adapt to a world increasingly turning against them. So, where do we stand today?
A quarter century of illusion
The acceleration European integration and the disarmament of its nations went hand in hand. The fall of the Soviet Union was seen as the end of one era and the dawn of another t that appeared to validate the core principles of European construction: peace through law, rules, and trade. The end of the Cold War was therefore a golden period for the Union, which monopolized political, diplomatic and budgetary energies, to the detriment of defense issues rendered obsolete by the disappearance of the ultimate enemy.
As far as the rest of the world was concerned, the future lay in cooperation that was destined to deepen almost automatically, in the image of the “ever closer union between the peoples of Europe” at the heart of the European project. In the distance, China was to mechanically become a major democratic player by joining the WTO, while closer to home, the aim of the neighbourhood policy was to gradually shape societies to the east and south of the continent, with a view to gradual integration with the Union. The Barcelona Process in 1995 and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership that followed perfectly illustrate this logic of integration through trade: a free-trade zone was planned for 2010 as a prelude to the gradual integration of countries on the southern shore through strengthened partnerships.
The armed forces of European countries therefore logically saw their size and role reduced. They became the tools of regional security in the face of remnants of violence, through the “peacekeeping” or “peacemaking” operations that multiplied from the 1990s onwards (Angola, Haiti, Cambodia, Georgia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, CAR, etc.), combined with “international policing” operations initiated with or without a UN mandate under the aegis of the United States (Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, Mali) or, after September 11, 2001, the “war on terrorism” (Syria, Iraq, Sahel). The hundred or so military engagements during this period were wars of choice, from the strong to the weak, intended to guarantee order, law and security. They proved costly, ineffective and counter-productive, as they demonstrated the limits of Western action and encouraged others to follow suit.
For Europeans, this was a period of illusions. In the absence of an existential threat to our countries and societies, the armed forces were confined to a role of external action, intervening at will against mostly unarmed adversaries. This was the era of “crisis management”, of the “global civil-military approach” and of coalition operations coordinated and controlled by the United States military, which was the only one truly capable of doing so. Between 1990 and 2015, European armies reduced their budgets and military capabilities, compensating for their weakness with a greater ability to intervene together, within NATO of course (France logically joined the integrated military structure in 2009), but also within the Union (since the launch of CSDP in 1999 and the first Concordia operation in Macedonia in 2003, 13 military operations have been conducted in 2015, 18 to date).
Despite the French desire for autonomy, the implicit aim of which was to create a form of European NATO, the military weakness of the Europeans prevented them from imagining emancipation from the protective American tutelage. As a result, the Union’s autonomous operations remained limited in scope and ambition. The difficulties encountered by France in mobilizing European support for its interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013-2014 were illustrations of this.
Russia returns, the United States moves away – Europe seeks capabilities
The gradual return of the Russian threat, starting with the invasion of Georgia in 2008 but especially with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, has been concomitant with the reduced importance attached by the American ally to European security, starting with the pivot to Asia initiated in 2011 by Barack Obama and amplified by subsequent administrations. This double movement has created a new vulnerability and a new dynamic within the Union, less focused on autonomy (we need to keep the Americans on board as long as possible) and small-scale operations (stabilization is becoming a secondary issue), and more focused on acquiring military capabilities to deal with the possibility of a major war.
Several initiatives have been launched: the European Defense Fund to support cooperation in defense technology research and development in 2016 (8 billion euros over 7 years), the European Peace Facility in 2021 to finance joint defense spending (17 billion euros from 2021-27), and the EDIRPA[1] mechanism in 2024 to co-finance collective defense equipment purchases, perpetuated by the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP) to develop the EDTIB.
This is a considerable effort: European defense budgets will have reached 552 billion euros by 2023, representing a 62% increase since 2014[2], approaching 2% of GDP on average. It does not, however, fully meet the challenges, as it is marked by structural deficiencies.
The first is the wide disparities between countries, linked to the catch-up phenomenon (France and the UK are increasing their already substantial expenditure less) and the perception of the Russian threat (Eastern and Central European countries are increasing their spending more[3]). The “free rider” attitude is confirmed, and collective security is assumed by a few major countries (the United States and, to a much lesser extent, France and the United Kingdom).
The economic and financial situation of European countries also hampers the sustainability of a long-term effort. Inflation is eating into budgets, economic difficulties are reinforcing the “butter versus guns” dilemma, and debt is becoming a major issue. Maintaining the defense effort will be a major political challenge in the years to come.
The urgency of the Russian threat to the countries of Eastern Europe calls for rapid rearmament, without any long-term strategic vision. The off-the-shelf purchase of American equipment is an appropriate solution for them, with the added advantage of encouraging the American protector to maintain its support. Donald Trump has already made explicit this conditionality, practiced more discreetly by his predecessors. The opening up of European capability development budgets to non-EU states is a response to this blackmail, and will inevitably increase. The resulting siphoning off of financial resources prevents the development of an autonomous European defense capability, making our continent even more dependent on its great ally – and even more vulnerable in the event of a letdown. Donald Trump’s switch to the revisionist camp is a nightmare scenario for Europeans.
Conflict becomes commonplace in the South too: Europe becomes prey
This emergency rearmament of capabilities in the face of Russia not only raises the question of the autonomy of European states, it also fails to fully address the challenge they face, marked by a race against time to respond to their growing vulnerability.
The Russian threat has not reduced the growing insecurity in southern Europe.
On the contrary, Moscow’s anti-European stance provides additional argument and concrete support for all those actors, state or non-state, who analyze world developments through the prism of de-Westernization and the twilight of a decadent Europe. The dynamism of a conquering Islam in southern Europe crystallizes incomprehension and resentment towards a political and social model perceived as unworthy and reprehensible. Europeans are portrayed by their opponents, whether in the East or South, as satiated, affluent, preachy, guilty, weak and cowardly. Gradually, the image of Europe as a scapegoat spread in the minds of populations and heads of state, and inhibitions began to crumble. Turkey’s aggressiveness towards Greece and France, its willingness to exploit migration to Europe, its indifference to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, its identification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with European colonialism, and the Houthis’ attacks on maritime trade in the Red Sea all illustrate the weakening of Europe’s position.
Europe no longer fascinates or frightens anyone.
This change in outlook is all the more worrying given that our competitors have grown stronger while we have grown weaker. Carried away by our post-historic self-assurance, convinced of our supremacy and the benevolence of our neighbors, we have participated in the dissemination of technologies and armaments that reduce or even cancel out our former superiority. Turkish submarines (U214 of German origin) or Algerian submarines (Kilo 636 upgraded with Kalibr cruise missiles of Russian origin), Russian S400 anti-aircraft missiles used by Turkish forces, Turkish TB2/3 drones or their equivalents which are becoming more widespread, Iranian Houthi anti-ship missiles (Sayyad and Sejjil cruisers or Mayun ballistic missiles) are examples of this technological proliferation, which places Europeans in a fragile position at sea, in the air and at home[4]. The refusal of many European navies to take part in operations to secure traffic in the Red Sea because of the risks to their warships is a good indicator of this rebalancing of the balance of military potential between European states and their southern neighbours.
Alongside the return of conventional threats, the insecurity represented by non-state actors has not disappeared. As far as the terrorist threat is concerned, the “low tide[5]” phase of European jihadism that we’ve experienced over the past few years could be coming to an end thanks to destabilization in the Sahel and Syria, while European societies don’t seem any better equipped to deal with it today. For its part, the increase in crime (89,000 deaths worldwide in 2017[6]), particularly drug and human trafficking, is destabilizing the continent’s social pacts and creating political tremors that are weakening institutions and their resilience.
This vulnerability is already being exploited by geopolitical players (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Russia). It provides a particularly effective lever for Russia, which, faced with unexpected resistance in Ukraine, has opened up an assertive front in the hybrid domain – on the northern shore, of course, to legitimize the war in Ukraine, undermine national cohesion and weaken democratic societies, but also on the southern shore by encouraging the eviction of French and Europeans from the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa, giving it a free hand to act on criminal, migratory and information flows to Europe. In this field, Moscow’s action is in synergy with other regional players such as Algiers and Ankara.
Back in history
Europe in 2025 is faced with a reality it never expected: a geopolitical threat in the East, and aggressive resentment in the South. These antagonisms could come together in a form of revenge driven by anti-modern models. The result could be an existential threat to Europe, its security, its sovereignty and its values.
The time has come for lucidity, courage and openness. First of all, we must mourn our lost illusions. Europe has borders, and neither Russia, Turkey nor the southern shores of the Mediterranean are part of it. Our neighbors refuse to adhere to what they identify as an outdated model, and we must accept this, despite the narcissistic disappointment we feel towards a civilization that thought of itself as the precursor of a universal project. This difference claimed by our interlocutors requires us to clarify what makes the European identity specific, which is not limited, as we believed, to free trade and law. The democratic fact, founded on the identity of conditions so dear to Tocqueville, while not exclusively European, and while it does not sum up our singularity, is part of the matrix that unites the continent’s societies. We will probably also have to question the relationship between national and European identities.
Rediscovering our European specificity will undoubtedly enable us to establish healthier, more peaceful relations with our neighbors. By accepting the Other as different, and identifying the objectives that oppose us and the interests that bring us closer together, we can reassure our interlocutors of our intentions (no colonial-style changes of regime or culture) and develop a clearer, more balanced strategy (which is another of our southern neighbors’ demands). On this point, the removal of the enlargement dossier from the portfolio of Commissioner Suica in charge of relations between the Union and its Mediterranean neighbors is a calming clarification.
Competition, sometimes violent, will not be absent from these relations, all the more so as our partners assume their opposition, are aware of a more balanced balance of power, and do not shy away from the use of armed force. We will therefore need to show courage to be able to dissuade blackmail or aggression. Of course, nuclear deterrence does not cover the many scenarios of aggression that we are no longer in a position to ward off. We therefore need to relearn how to make risk an integral part of our daily lives, and how to scare people with threats of first strikes and retaliation. This requires an effort in terms of autonomous capabilities, political courage and moral strength.
But it is not enough to be present in the game of force: Europeans must relearn how to create the conditions for peace, in other words, how to play politics.
By taking into account the interests of each party, the balance of power and the compromises made, we must be able to draw up a strategy that will arbitrate between shared and unshared objectives. While geopolitical power relations will dominate relations with Russia, there are many possible areas of partnership around the Mediterranean: migration, water management, agriculture, energy, civil protection, health, tourism, repatriation of value chains, etc.
To the east and south, and now also to the west, there is still time for Europe to adapt to a world that has brutally altered the relations it has tried to establish with its neighbors.
[1] European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common procurement act.
[2] Euronews-SIPRI, April 22, 2024.
[3] Julien Malizard, « Augmentation des dépenses de défense en Europe : du discours à la réalité budgétaire », FRS, June 15, 2023.
[4] Atlas of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 2024, FMES.
[5] Hugo Micheron, La Colère et l’oubli, Gallimard, 2023.
[6] “La gangstérisation du monde”, La documentation française, Questions internationales, June-September 2024.
