By Joséphine Dutardre, Junior Researcher at the FMES Institute
The gradual withdrawal of the United States reveals the weaknesses of European defence: strategic dependence, insufficient manpower, scattered capabilities. Despite substantial budgets and significant military potential, European forces struggle to exert collective influence. The real weakness goes beyond the military sphere alone: it is the lack of identity, of the will to exert influence, and of national and European cohesion that prevent Europe from transforming its resources into real power. Without integration, European armies remain disorganised, their capacity for autonomous action limited and their industrial efforts too fragmented. Europe has the means to defend itself, but not yet the common will to do so. Without a shared awareness of Europe’s strategic destiny, arsenals will not suffice. Material rearmament also implies moral and intellectual rearmament. This article offers a lucid analysis of the current impasses and the conditions necessary for the emergence of a true European military power.
For any Eastern European, Nordic or Baltic country, “the [Russian] threat requires a response (…) based primarily on investment in defence, which is not the case in Spain. Our threat is not a Russia bringing its troops across the Pyrenees to the Iberian Peninsula,” said the Spanish Prime Minister in March 2025 at a press conference. Behind this statement lies a brutal reality: the security concerns of Eastern European, Nordic and Baltic states – directly exposed to Russian pressure – do not coincide with those of Southern European countries, which are more focused on other threats: instability in the Sahel, growing migratory pressure, trafficking in the Mediterranean and terrorist threats. While Russia is a cause for concern for Western European countries, this is not so much because of a direct military threat as because of other forms of pressure: hybrid warfare, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, attempts at political destabilisation, exploitation of threats from the South, and corruption strategies aimed at weakening institutions and internal cohesion. These differences in the prioritisation of threats illustrate a deep divide within the European continent.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR marked the beginning of a period of disarmament for the European Union, which, in the midst of enlargement, focused on political, economic and diplomatic integration with the aim of strengthening internal synergies within Europe to ward off the spectre of war between Member States. The time had come to reduce the role of the state, dilute sovereignties and strengthen supranational governance. Europe thus relegated defence issues to the background, betting on a peaceful world and American protection within NATO.
Today, history is brutally repeating itself, states are regaining control, sovereignties are resurging, and Europe is faced with the need to defend what it has not been prepared to protect for decades. The time is no longer for integration as a matter of principle, but for the ability to resist, together, in a world that has become unstable once again, with threats emanating from the East, the South, and now even the West.
The gradual disengagement of the United States from the European continent is revealing Europe’s vulnerabilities. The upheavals in President Trump’s policy are forcing European countries to undertake a complete review of their strategic orientations, an exercise that had not been carried out since the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite a sudden surge during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and then in 2022. Donald Trump is forcing the ‘old continent’ to radically rethink its defence model and consider solutions to counter its dependence and take back control of its security.
Yet there is no shortage of assets: professional and experienced armed forces, substantial defence budgets, economic power and diplomatic influence. On paper, Europe has the means to defend itself, even among the major powers. But this advantage remains largely theoretical, as it requires speaking with one voice – and this is still far from being the case today.
This lack of unity results in duplication, industrial rivalries, divergent analyses and persistent reluctance to pool sovereignty and responsibilities in the field of defence. As long as Europe remains a collection of fragmented national interests, its military weight will remain well below what its actual capabilities could allow it to achieve. The challenge is therefore clear: to transform fragmented potential into a coherent force capable of responding to the multiple threats of the 21st century.
The withdrawal of the United States exposes the vulnerabilities of Europe and its defence
Since taking office, Donald Trump has been questioning the very essence of transatlantic relations. He is revisiting the United States’ historic commitment to guarantee the defence of the European continent, including through the extension of its nuclear deterrent. While his foreign policy is in line with a trend already initiated by his predecessors – that of a gradual disengagement from Europe in favour of Asia – Donald Trump is much more explicit about it. China, identified as ‘the only threat’ to the United States, is the focus of the White House’s priorities, as it seeks to lighten the financial burden that the old continent represents. At present, European security remains closely linked to American support in many areas.
Like the agreements between Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump on customs duties, where the EU gave in under pressure without receiving anything in return, the NATO summit on 24 and 25 June 2025 illustrated the same posture of forced alignment with Washington. As a spectator at a summit held by one man, it would seem that Europe has paid for the structural weaknesses it has been dragging along since its disarmament. Fearing Donald Trump’s unpredictable reactions, which could undermine their security, European countries opted for caution, doing everything possible to ensure peace at this summit, showing complacency, flattering the American president and avoiding as much as possible the sensitive subject of Ukraine. The European member countries of the Alliance obediently committed to spending 5% of their GDP on defence and security by 2035 (including 3.5% on defence spending alone).
The United States is the Alliance’s largest financial contributor and heads most of the Alliance’s headquarters, including the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Since coming to power, Donald Trump has shown little interest in NATO, and has made no secret of it: by regularly stating that he will not protect countries that do not meet their budgetary obligations or those in arrears, the US president is calling into question the application of Article 5, ‘one for all, all for one’, the cornerstone of the organisation. A US withdrawal from NATO would disrupt the functioning of the operational chain of command and the entire balance of this military alliance, and would threaten, at least in the short term, the credible protection of Europeans against Russia.
European dependence on American armaments
Secondly, Europe is largely dependent on American arms. As can be seen in the graph below, in 2024, 54% of European States’ arms imports came from the United States. In general, imports mainly concern armoured vehicles, combat aircraft (F-35), engines and air defence equipment (MIM-104 Patriot system).
This dependence on American weapons can be explained both by European countries’ desire to guarantee a certain level of strategic support from the United States in return for their purchases, but also by the speed of delivery, the level of sophistication of American equipment and the more limited availability of alternatives in Europe. By aiming for interoperability with the US military, European countries are locking themselves into a vicious circle: each purchase of American armaments makes them more dependent and inevitably leads to further similar purchases.
European countries’ dependence on American weapons varies from country to country; while the main importers are Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Norway, France is almost self-sufficient, buying mainly tank engines from the Americans, as well as catapults for its aircraft carrier. The second (United Kingdom) and third (Germany) largest armies in Europe purchase strategic equipment, such as aircraft and missiles, from the United States. Poland, for its part, is heavily dependent on the United States (and more recently South Korea) as it produces very little equipment on its own soil[1]. This highlights a clear paradox: the largest armies in European countries that claim to want to strengthen European defence capabilities are equipping themselves with American weapons. These countries are depriving European manufacturers of contracts worth hundreds of billions of euros, such as the $70 billion spent by the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, Romania and Denmark. Of the ten European countries that placed orders for fighter jets between 2019 and 2023, eight chose American aircraft (F-16 or F-35), and only two chose the French Rafale[2].
The purchase of American arms compromises any real strategic autonomy: there is a clause in American law stipulating that equipment or arms purchased from the United States cannot be used by the purchasing countries if Washington vetoes it[3]. This blocking power allows the United States to maintain effective control over the use of the weapons it exports. In this context, the unpredictability of Donald Trump’s foreign policy poses an increased threat to European countries, particularly those that depend on this equipment. Indeed, after his clash with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 28 February 2025, Donald Trump not only abruptly halted the shipment of weapons and intelligence to Ukraine, but also threatened to remotely deactivate exported strategic equipment, rendering it inoperable. The Americans have the ability to act on their equipment, for example by preventing updates to the F-35s or restricting access to certain data services, which would significantly degrade the performance and capabilities of the aircraft[4]. The use of these weapons therefore remains subject to the whims of an American president who is currently unpredictable. Acquiring American military equipment no longer even guarantees political or strategic support from Washington. This dependence exposes European countries to the risk of having their military capabilities neutralised remotely in the event of diplomatic disagreement. Such a situation profoundly undermines the credibility and sovereignty of European states on the international stage. Consequently, continuing to purchase large quantities of equipment from the United States amounts to mortgaging any ambition for real strategic autonomy, while exposing oneself to unilateral reversals dictated by the vagaries of US domestic politics.
For Europe to be able to do without the United States for its armaments, European alternatives would have to exist. And the European defence industry (BITDE), designed primarily to meet the requirements of peacetime, is now struggling to support ambitions for strategic autonomy. The dominance of the American defence industry over its European counterpart remains clear: the top five places in the global ranking of the 100 largest defence companies are occupied by American firms, which alone generate nearly a third of total global turnover. Only four European manufacturers manage to make it into the ‘top 20’[5].
European industrial cooperation is therefore a strategic imperative that must be central to national defence policies and the common strategy in order to reduce dependence on the United States and increase European strategic autonomy. This involves pooling programmes, enhancing interoperability, securing supply chains and launching joint projects. However, this ambition faces several obstacles: the desire to protect industrial sovereignty, divergent strategic orientations, technological rivalries and the complexity of regulatory frameworks.
European dependence on certain American technologies
Furthermore, certain technological resources deployed by the United States in Europe are now essential to the continent’s defence. Whether satellite surveillance and communication systems, military cloud infrastructure hosting strategic data, artificial intelligence tools dedicated to intelligence and cyber defence, or logistical capabilities for rapid force projection, these capabilities continue to form the basis of many NATO operations. By breaking free from the United States, Europe will have to accept a transitional phase marked by a significant decline in its operational capabilities. This inevitable period of adjustment will require massive investment, enhanced cooperation between Member States and a coordinated industrial strategy to fill the gaps.
The American nuclear umbrella, essential for Europe’s defence
Europe’s dependence on the American nuclear umbrella adds to this picture of vulnerability. Around a hundred American nuclear bombs are currently deployed in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey and Italy. If Donald Trump decided to withdraw the US military arsenal stationed in Europe, the credibility of Europe’s strategic posture would be further weakened. Indeed, French and British deterrence capabilities are not large enough to replace the US nuclear presence. There are also structural differences: France has both an air force and a strategic oceanic force, while the United Kingdom relies exclusively on its submarine force. This specialisation makes any scenario involving a warning strike with reduced payloads particularly complex, as such an option would require revealing the position of its submarines, compromising the very effectiveness of British deterrence. Furthermore, despite London’s claims of political autonomy in the use of its arsenal, its missiles are supplied by Washington and rely in part on close technical cooperation with the United States.
A withdrawal or reduction of US capabilities in Europe – whether in missile defence, command and control (C2) capabilities, ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities or long-range missiles – could seriously compromise the security of the continent. If Washington were to call into question the very principle of extended deterrence, NATO’s entire strategic posture would be weakened. France does not currently participate in NATO’s shared nuclear deterrence programme (Nuclear Planning Group – NPG), and the possibility of extending France’s nuclear umbrella to other European countries remains highly controversial[6] – and has been the subject of numerous political declarations that are difficult to implement. Since 2020, Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly stated that France’s vital interests have a European dimension, even mentioning the opening of a dialogue on the possible extension of French nuclear deterrence to the continent. This proposal has found some support among several European leaders who see this debate as a necessary step towards a potential European-wide deterrent. However, doubts remain about France’s technical capabilities to apply its deterrent to the whole of Europe. Furthermore, some experts agree that French nuclear forces are insufficient to be applied on a continental scale. Added to this is political uncertainty: there is no guarantee that Emmanuel Macron’s successors will wish to maintain this commitment after the 2027 presidential election, with some candidates taking more Eurosceptic positions[7]. Furthermore, extending France’s nuclear umbrella could provide an excuse for the United States to reduce its support.
Beyond this situation, anti-nuclear positions continue to exist in Europe, notably with Austria and Ireland, which have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This internal division complicates any coordination at the European level on the nuclear issue.
The deterrent presence of American troops on the European continent
Finally, some 100,000 American soldiers (including 65,000 on a permanent basis) are deployed in around forty military bases stationed across the continent: this constitutes an essential deterrent presence, which would have to be replaced in the event of an American withdrawal. However, European armies are already facing great difficulties in maintaining their troop numbers. Despite recruitment campaigns and increasing investment, the number of soldiers is declining in several major European powers, including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain. The United Kingdom, for example, has not met its annual recruitment targets since 2010[8]. Today, among NATO’s European members, 21 states have a professional army, Iceland has no armed forces, and eight states use conscription. The American military presence therefore appears essential for the defence of Europe today. This vulnerability shows that, while the immediate priority is to strengthen equipment, budgetary efforts must also be extended to human resources. Beyond equipment, the ability to recruit and train a sufficient number of soldiers remains crucial to ensuring the operational effectiveness of Europe’s defence. To this end, it is essential to raise awareness among both leaders and the general public.
Beyond American dependence: the real challenge for European defence lies in the lack of coordination and political unity and the need for a mental revolution
The European Union has the means to assert itself as a major military power. In 2024, its defence budget was the second largest in the world after that of the United States[9]. If we add to this budget that of the United Kingdom, Europe’s second largest military budget[10], This budget amounts to €442 billion for the year 2024.
In terms of conventional capabilities, the United States dominates Russia in the air and at sea, has a global network of military bases, rapid deployment capabilities, and excellent joint coordination. This operational mastery reinforces its role as a global strategic player capable of responding quickly to a crisis.
But if we add up their air and land forces, as shown in the graphs above, Europeans surpass Russia in both areas. This shows that Europe theoretically has the potential to play a leading role on the international stage.
However, Europe’s potential in terms of military budget and capabilities does not translate into military capabilities comparable to those of the major powers. Unlike the United States or Russia, the EU does not speak with one voice. It has neither a single command nor a common strategic vision. National positions still vary widely, often dictated by geographical proximity to Russia: the closer a country is, the higher its military spending[11].
This lack of convergence hinders the ability to make collective decisions, plan joint operations and allocate roles and resources effectively. The lack of political and military cohesion significantly weakens the impact of these investments and makes any coordinated action difficult, if not impossible. In this context, bilateral cooperation is increasing, particularly within blocs of countries, to the detriment of cooperation within existing joint structures such as NATO and the EU. The air forces of Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway are thus achieving a high level of integration in terms of operational cooperation[12].
But the problem goes beyond military organisation alone: it is also cultural and political. Europe suffers from a lack of a common defence spirit, weakened from the outset by the population’s lack of attachment to the defence of their own nation. This is particularly true in the nations of Western Europe, which, geographically distant from Russia, consider this threat to be abstract. Few Western European citizens are willing to see their daily lives disrupted or their standard of living impacted in order to strengthen European defence. Thus, without a spirit of defence rooted in the population, it is very difficult to justify the political choices and budgets that the situation requires.
This observation is accentuated by the fact that in most European countries, defence funding is subject to already heavy fiscal and budgetary constraints. In the absence of new financial resources, internal trade-offs would have to be made, which would mean cutting back on other national priorities such as education or health. In peacetime, convincing citizens to accept such a transfer of resources seems very complicated and requires considerable educational efforts. The political cost, particularly in Western Europe, remains prohibitive for the time being.
Yet every day, Ukrainians remind us of a fundamental truth: the survival of a nation – or a continent – requires the ability to take considerable risks, whether human, material or economic. We must therefore rebuild a strong bond between citizens, their country and their army, but also extend this bond to the whole continent. Without a sense of belonging to a national or European community of destiny, no sacrifice can be demanded of the population in the event of war. Without such a sense of belonging, it is difficult to demand sacrifices or to mobilise public opinion in the long term. The defence of Europe must be seen as a collective responsibility. The recent exchange between Donald Trump and Ursula von der Leyen on customs tariffs has shown the current limits of European determination. Indeed, this episode illustrates Europe’s reluctance to accept paying a moderate economic cost to defend its interests. If Europe is already struggling to assert itself and take risks in the commercial arena, how can it prepare to face the much greater risks – human, financial and political – involved in achieving true military autonomy? In the absence of a shared strategic culture, Europe’s ambitions for independence will remain theoretical and the continent’s credibility as a security actor will remain fragile, if not contested.
Three scenarios for rethinking European defence
Faced with this situation, three scenarios are possible.
The “every man for himself” option, which requires American support
First scenario: no change, or almost no change. The EU would remain focused on its economic functions, and defense would continue to be managed primarily by member states, each according to its own priorities and resources. Eastern Europe would continue to strengthen its armies with the more or less constant support of the United States, while Southern and Western Europe would focus on issues arising from the South and rely more on diplomacy, economic stability, and expeditionary forces. In this case, the situation would remain highly dependent on two external factors: the US stance and the evolution of Russia’s ambitions and its ability to threaten its neighbors militarily. This scenario would perpetuate the current fragmentation, at the cost of lasting strategic vassalization.
The federalist option: towards a “United States of Europe”
On paper, the idea is appealing in its clarity: if Europe formed a single state, with a single army, a unified foreign policy, and merged strategic capabilities, it would become a military power of the first order. The figures prove it: demographics, budget, technology… A federal Europe would surpass Russia in several conventional areas and regain credible strategic autonomy in the face of external threats.
But this vision faces a major obstacle: its political and democratic acceptability to populations who do not recognize a common interest and destiny. Accepting such a model would imply a massive loss of national sovereignty and an unprecedented centralization of power. How far are the peoples of Europe willing to go in terms of integration to ensure the independence and security of a space that eludes them?
A new, stronger European defense collective: “hardcore Europe”
However, a middle ground could emerge that is more realistic and suited to the current context: recreating a credible European collective, while accepting the resurgence of states and sovereignties. Rather than seeking to erase nations in favor of a supranational entity, the aim would be to build a Europe of defense based on voluntary cooperation between those states that wish to do so, contributing to a common effort in the (fairly broad) areas of defense. This core group would accept stronger solidarity arrangements in the areas of equipment, doctrine, command, and engagement. The smaller size and selectivity would allow for this deepening without denying national sovereignty. Around this solid and dissuasive core, which could have political meaning for the populations concerned, a flexible and pragmatic European defense confederation could be formed, allowing other states to participate as third countries, according to their capabilities and their specific perception of threats. The issue of nuclear deterrence would remain central: it would have to be integrated into this hard core, either through gradual pooling of existing capabilities or through strengthened guarantee and sharing agreements, in order to give Europe credibility in the face of the major powers.
Europeans could turn the threat of American disengagement into a lever for autonomy
To combat their vulnerabilities, rather than seeking to replicate the American model, which is based on accumulating military capabilities that are often disproportionate to actual needs, Europeans would be better off defining their own priorities based on the threats that directly affect them. Many experts agree that the United States itself has sometimes failed to develop capabilities that are truly suited to its recent military engagements, relying too heavily on complex and costly technologies.
Recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, have revealed a major trend: technology alone is no longer enough. Air superiority and precision weapons, however advanced they may be, are insufficient without the massive and sustained production of ammunition, missiles, and drones, and above all without the total support of a population that is united behind its army. Today, what makes the difference on the battlefield is as much the ability to endure in a war of attrition as it is to deploy sophisticated weapons on an ad hoc basis. Europe has sophisticated equipment but lacks ammunition. European fighter jets are truly modern, but the associated ammunition stockpiles are insufficient to destroy an adversary’s air defenses or to strike long-range targets on the ground or in the air.
In this context, what some describe as the “weakness” of European armies — their “sampling” nature, characterized by a wide variety of equipment but low volumes — can in fact become a strategic asset. This diversity of formats and equipment, although insufficient in volume, offers a rich basis for innovation and rapid adaptation to new types of warfare. Thus, instead of seeking to qualitatively strengthen its armaments, Europe should give priority to strengthening its capabilities in terms of drones, artillery, ground-to-air defense systems, etc., and ensure their interoperability in an autonomous manner.
The example of Ukraine clearly demonstrates this: armies that make extensive use of drones, even inexpensive ones, have a decisive advantage in reconnaissance, fire correction, and targeted strikes. European armies, which are still lagging far behind in this area, must take inspiration from this by accelerating the integration of these technologies into their conventional forces. The era of “high-tech, all-purpose” armies is beginning to run out of steam; the task now is to build a robust defense capable of withstanding shocks and prolonged conflicts while remaining technologically agile.
Conclusion
The gradual withdrawal of the United States and its increasingly imperial stance exposes the fragility of a dependent Europe, which finds itself in an extremely dangerous position of vassalage. But beyond this observation of powerlessness, this situation also opens up a window of opportunity—and even a necessity: to build true strategic autonomy, not only military, but also economic and technological, so as to no longer depend on the vagaries imposed by third powers. This autonomy requires massive financial efforts and a strengthening of military capabilities. European countries must focus on disruptive technologies (AI, cybersecurity, drones, electromagnetic cannons) and, above all, pool their industrial efforts in joint projects in order to gain coherence and efficiency.
But the challenge is not limited to material resources; a common spirit of defense and the support of the people are essential conditions for collectively accepting the sacrifices that defense requires. This support must be accompanied by a clear desire to play a role on the international stage and to assert ourselves as a united entity facing a common destiny. Without a collective awareness of Europe’s destiny – from Lisbon to Tallinn – even the most modern arsenals will not suffice.
Finally, it would be illusory to expect uniform progress from all European countries. In the short term, the most realistic path is a multi-speed defense: a core group of willing nations ready to pool their capabilities, harmonize their doctrines, and finance more ambitious projects, while others remain on the sidelines. This multi-speed Europe would allow us to act quickly on some of the identified weaknesses at a time when we need to accelerate our defense efforts.
[1] Ibid.
[2] ‘The European defence industry in six questions’, Vie publique, 17 March 2025. URL link: https://www.vie-publique.fr/questions-reponses/297652-industrie-de-defense-europeenne-bitde-en-six-questions
[3]VIGNAL François, “Defense: Europeans’ dependence on American weapons, ‘a very big collective problem’,” Public Sénat, March 11, 2025. URL link: https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/international/defense-la-dependance-des-europeens-aux-armes-americaines-un-tres-gros-probleme-collectif
[4]Ibid.
[5]Information report, No. 2625, National Assembly, May 15, 2024. URL link: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/rapports/cion_def/l16b2625_rapport-information#
[6]HOORICKX Estelle, « L’OTAN sans les États-Unis. Quelle défense pour l’Europe ? », le 21/01/2025. Lien URL : https://www.areion24.news/2025/01/21/lotan-sans-les-etats-unis-quelle-defense-pour-leurope/2/
[7] MAITRE Emmanuelle, « Dissuasion nucléaire : Une évolution des perceptions en Europe », DSI « Défendre l’Europe » N°103 (Hors-série), aout-septembre 2025.
[8]CARBONARO Giulia, « Pourquoi les armées européennes peinent-elles à étoffer leurs troupes ? », Euronews, le 14/02/2024. Lien URL :https://fr.euronews.com/2024/02/16/pourquoi-les-armees-europeennes-peinent-elles-a-etoffer-leurs-troupes
[9]CHAABAN Florian, « Défense : les dépenses militaires en forte hausse en Europe », Toute l’Europe, le 28/04 :2025. Lien URL : https://www.touteleurope.eu/l-ue-dans-le-monde/defense-les-depenses-militaires-en-forte-hausse-en-europe/
[10] Représentant 82 milliards d’euros en 2024.
[11] Notamment une du cabinet de consultants Roland Berger réalisée en mai 2025.
[12] HENROTIN Joseph, « Du difficile retour aux rationalités stratégiques », DSI « Défendre l’Europe » N°103 (Hors-série), aout-septembre 2025.
