The war initiated by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February 2026 must be understood at the intersection of both global power competition—primarily involving the United States, China, and Russia—and regional rivalries among the Middle East’s four key actors: Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
While the conduct of operations may appear erratic, even improvised, Donald Trump is in fact implementing a strategic framework laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS) released earlier this year. In keeping with its stated priorities, Washington has already resorted to military action (in Venezuela) and issued threats of intervention (in Greenland and Cuba), with the objective of securing its immediate geopolitical environment under what has been described as the “Donroe” doctrine.
Within the broader context of great power competition, the United States appears intent on maintaining its strategic edge at limited cost. To that end, it is seeking to weaken or neutralize Russian and Chinese proxies, while at the same time creating dilemmas that compel both Moscow and Beijing to clarify their strategic priorities—whether between Ukraine and the Middle East in Russia’s case, or between Taiwan and energy security in China’s. Continued diplomatic engagement over Ukraine provides Washington with leverage not only over Russia but also over its European allies. The intervention in Iran should also be viewed through the lens of pressure on China. In effect, the United States is attempting a high-risk strategic consolidation, aiming to reduce multiple points of friction in order to approach more critical theatres—particularly Taiwan and North Korea—from a stronger position.
The consequences of this intervention are complex. On the one hand, it offers Russia a temporary strategic reprieve by diverting attention away from Ukraine. On the other, it undermines Moscow’s long-term position by restricting its access to warm waters and disrupting its supply of Iranian drones. More significantly, the partial disruption of Iranian oil production—combined with tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and retaliatory strikes against Gulf energy infrastructure—has contributed to rising hydrocarbon prices and tighter supply conditions, thereby increasing pressure on China. Through this sequence, Washington is pursuing several objectives simultaneously: weakening a longstanding regional adversary, reasserting its dominance in the Middle East, and reinforcing its capacity to influence global energy markets that remain vital to Asian economies.
At the regional level, the conflict is reshaping existing balances of power. Israel’s objective is clear: to eliminate what it perceives as an existential threat by targeting Iran’s nuclear and ballistic capabilities, weakening the regime, and potentially fostering conditions conducive to internal unrest. Having already degraded key elements of Iran’s strategic programs, Israeli operations now appear increasingly focused on the regime’s coercive apparatus. At the same time, Israel is taking advantage of the situation to intensify pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon, aware of the Lebanese state’s limited capacity to contain the group. Achieving these goals, however, depends on sustained access to advanced weaponry and continued U.S. military support.
Despite significant losses, the Iranian regime has so far demonstrated a notable capacity for resilience. While much of its leadership has been eliminated, replacement structures have emerged. Its conventional military capabilities—particularly in the air and at sea—have been severely degraded, and its command systems disrupted. Nevertheless, its decentralized “mosaic” approach to warfare allows it to maintain operational continuity. Although weakened, Iran retains a credible retaliatory capability, which continues to carry political weight. The remaining leadership, facing an existential struggle, appears determined to prolong and broaden the conflict in order to raise its political cost for both Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, betting in part on growing opposition within U.S. public opinion. Even in the event of a formal ceasefire, Tehran is likely to sustain a lower-intensity confrontation, thereby asserting control over the timing of any genuine de-escalation.
The Gulf monarchies, by contrast, emerge as particularly exposed. The conflict highlights structural vulnerabilities in both their security arrangements and economic models, raising questions about their long-term sustainability. Among them, Saudi Arabia—by virtue of its demographic and economic weight—is better positioned to absorb the shock than its smaller neighbors within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Turkey, for its part, may stand to benefit from the relative weakening of its regional competitors, provided it avoids direct entanglement and pursues a calibrated strategy aimed at quietly consolidating its influence across the Middle East and its periphery.
Should the United States fail in this high-stakes gamble and emerge diplomatically isolated or strategically weakened, new opportunities could open for other actors. France, having fulfilled its defensive commitments to regional partners without engaging in offensive operations, could find itself in a position to expand its role and influence.
